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ON THE NATURE OF NORMS:
BIOLOGY, MORALITY, AND
THE DISRUPTION OF ORDER
Owen D. Jones*
THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTITU-
TION OF SOCIAL ORDER. By Francis Fukuyama. New York: The
Free Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 354. $26
The analysis of where norms come from is colored by the strong ideo-
logical preferences people have as to where they ought to come from. [p.
189]
For a long time - and through the now-quaint division of disci-
plines - morals and norms have been set apart from other behavior-
biasing phenomena. They have also been set apart from each other.
Morals are generally ceded in full to philosophers. Norms have been
ceded to sociologists.
In retrospect, it is not clear why this should be so. Reality is noto-
riously impervious to taxonomy, and the axis supposedly distinguish-
ing morals from other norms is, after all, arbitrary. Moreover,
behavior-biasing phenomena interact in important ways, making the
study of parts - without more - just the study of parts. But one
thing is clear. To the extent that understanding morals and norms is
important to law, studying the two apart from other behavior-biasing
phenomena creates a problem.
This problem arises because of opportunity costs. Whenever a
topic - such as morality - is both relevant to law and without a
uniquely legal theoretical foundation, legal thinkers must rely (at least
initially) on disciplines claiming expertise. But in a world in which the
academy has divided reality into disciplinary slices - which, having
once been sundered, are neither differently divisible nor easily recom-
bined - there is an ever-present risk to law of disciplinary capture.
As, for example, when legal thinkers may too hastily elevate the pro-
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law; Faculty Fellow, Center
for the Study of Law, Science, and Technology; Research Fellow, Gruter Institute for Law
and Behavioral Research. B.A. 1985, Amherst College; J.D. 1991, Yale Law School. - Ed.
The author acknowledges the generous scholarship support of the Arizona State University
College of Law, and thanks Lydia Jones for helpful comments, and Marc Rubin for helpful
research assistance. Please direct correspondence to <owen.jones@asu.edu>.
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nouncements of one discipline, perhaps the one most hypertrophied or
shouting loudest, over another.
The costs of such disciplinary capture increase according to the
value that foregone knowledge from another discipline would have of-
fered. And in today's world, in which knowledge accumulates at an
ever-quickening pace, these opportunity costs climb faster than ever
before, making each choice about where to turn for insights on human
behavior fraught with consequence. To disciplines like law, in par-
ticular, charged with practical matters of great human importance, the
costs of foregoing useful knowledge can be affirmatively harmful, not
just intellectually embarrassing.
As consumers and appliers of knowledge from other disciplines,
legal thinkers should play - indeed should feel obligated to play - a
far more active role in furthering interdisciplinary integration of sub-
jects relevant to law. Of course, the inevitable limits on the accumula-
tion of individual expertise make it endlessly tempting for even the
most talented and committed interdisciplinary thinkers in the legal
academy to mine a single disciplinary vein (economics or cognitive
psychology, for example) to its maximum depths. There are econo-
mies of scale. And many great and useful insights can be and have
been gained thereby. But the common isolation of our proliferated
disciplinary mineshafts from even near neighbors often forecloses the
important and available benefits that broad, cross-connective integra-
tion could provide. Put simply, scholars of various disciplines often
work to solve the same problems, unaware that their efforts are
closely paralleled by those with whom intellectual trade would yield
mutual gains.
Such is the case with morals and norms. To the extent that legal
thinkers have in fact recently begun to move beyond philosophy and
sociology for more information, they have turned primarily to eco-
nomics, psychology, and game theory. But even this happy develop-
ment remains an incomplete achievement (reflecting, as it does, a la-
tent tendency to elevate the social sciences over the life sciences,
rather than partnering them). Behavioral biology has at least as much
to offer to the study of morality and norms as these other disciplines,
perhaps more. Many primatologists, behavioral ecologists, ethologists,
neuroanatomists, and behavioral geneticists have long studied the ori-
gins of and patterns in, for example, human and nonhuman coopera-
tion and altruism, reciprocity and hostility, division of labor, sharing of
production, and identification and treatment of cheaters on social
norms. Their work has sound theoretical foundations, and is empiri-
cally robust. Without the contributions of behavioral biologists to the
study of morals and norms, legal thinkers risk errors that are harmful,
not just intellectually embarrassing.
Why can we state this with confidence? Because: a) law is funda-
mentally about levering human behavior in directions it might not go
2073May 200]
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on its own; b) law's fulcrum in this effort is its model of where behav-
ior comes from; and c) behavior is fundamentally a biological phe-
nomenon. Consequently, any model of behavior inconsistent with the
foundations of modem behavioral biology is inaccurate and obsolete.
(Or else the unheralded ferment of a true intellectual and scientific
revolution.) And thus legal approaches to understanding and influ-
encing human behavior that are based on outdated behavioral models
are simply less likely to effect socially and legally desirable outcomes
than might be the case if the behavioral models were more conceptu-
ally robust.
This should hardly be surprising. The centrality of biology to un-
derstanding human behavior is not just a matter of academic accesso-
rizing. Biology is not just another "and" at the "Law and -" buffet,
to be sampled at convenience, when tastes turn. Biology is truly foun-
dational, having both broad and practical relevance at a completely
different level of analysis than, say, economics or sociology. For just
as theories of chemistry must be consistent, in the end, with theories of
physics - and theories of biology must be consistent, in turn, with
theories of chemistry and physics - theories of economics, sociology,
psychology, philosophy, anthropology, and all the rest must be consis-
tent, in the end, with the basic principles of biology.
The most basic principle of biology, in turn, is evolution - par-
ticularly evolution by natural selection. Natural selection occurs in
any system in which there is differential reproductive success as a
function of heritable variation. Put simply, any population of replica-
tors, in which variations in heritable traits affect future replicative suc-
cess, will tend, over generations, to accumulate an increasing propor-
tion of traits that contribute to replicative success.!
The power of this deceptively simple insight - and its ultimate
relevance to law - lies in its ability to explain not only species-typical
patterns of form, but also species-typical patterns of behavior. (Or
what some people term a species-typical nature.) More specifically,
natural selection shapes the physical and chemical information-
processing pathways of the brain in ways that have tended, over time,
to contribute to the survival and reproductive success of organisms
that bear them. These information-processing pathways yield behav-
ioral predispositions. Of which, to circle back, morals and norms are a
subset.
Francis Fukuyama understands all this.2 He has written an exu-
berantly creative, thorough, and highly stimulating book on the rela-
tionship between political and economic order on one hand, and social
1. See generally sources cited infra note 27.
2. Francis Fukuyama is the Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at
George Mason University.
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and moral order, on the other. Specifically, he argues that under-
standing the human future requires us to see underappreciated con-
nections between politics, economics, law, social order, morals, norms,
and biology. It is a big task. For Fukuyama undertakes nothing less,
in The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of
Social Order, than to identify recent patterns in social order and dis-
order, to offer novel explanations for their origins, and to make pre-
dictions about what will happen next. But Fukuyama has never been
one to shy away from big tasks. (His prior works include, for example,
the ambitiously titled The End of History and the Last Man.3) And in
The Great Disruption, true to his subtitle, Fukuyama ambitiously en-
lists the life sciences, integrating them with social sciences, in aid of a
deeper understanding of human behavior and morality, and in fur-
therance of political science analysis.4 His message is synthetic, ex-
planatory, predictive, and in the end, consoling. His methods are, for
legal thinkers and others, engaging, instructive, and sometimes cau-
tioning.
I. CONTEXT
Fukuyama's major hurdle, in arguing for the relevance of life sci-
ence perspectives on human morality, is context. His contextual
problem extends past disciplinary divisions to the history of science
itself. Beyond the endlessly important but by now cich6 observation
that bad things have been done in the name of good science, lies an
even deeper resistance to his effort. For we can view the march of the
science he invokes as, in many ways, leading a steady retreat from
human uniqueness.
Time and again, through history, we have developed a perfectly
plausible way of viewing our place on the planet. It comports with our
preferences for the way the world ought sensibly to operate. It con-
forms to our convictions. It makes us feel special in the dark danger-
ous night. And then along comes some flag-waver like Fukuyama,
preaching the scientific virtues of parsimony and falsification, who
shoots our favored theories full of holes. Constructive or destructive?
It depends on where you happen to be standing at the time. Progress
is less preferable when progress threatens prominence.
3. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
Fukuyama's subsequent book, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY (1995), provides an equally ambitious argument that trust is the underappreci-
ated linchpin of economic prosperity.
4. His efforts in this regard parallel that of legal thinkers, employing evolutionary analy-
sis in law, who enlist life science perspectives in furtherance of existing legal goals. For in-
formation on the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (SEAL), see <http:llwww.
sealsite.org>. For sources exploring the utility to law of integrating biological perspectives,
see infra note 27.
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And science has, one must admit, served up steady threats to our
prominence. When Copernican reasoning ultimately exposed as false
our belief that Earth was the physical center of everything, we re-
treated to the less bold claim that at least, and after all, we among all
life sprang full-blown from time, in full modem form, as the direct,
special, and unchanged-from-the-beginning creation of a supernatural
power. Theoretically possible - until Darwin shrank the probability
toward zero.
Thereafter, we retreated into successively more humble claims to
uniqueness.' First, we were the only tool users. But that didn't work.6
Then we restaked the boundaries of uniqueness, imagining that we
and we alone were capable of culture - the intergenerational and
non-genetic transmission of novel information or forms of behavior.
But that has proved to be equally incorrect. 7 Our latest, perhaps last,
retreat therefore stakes the once imperialistic boundaries of human
uniqueness ever closer to home - surgically dividing the moral from
the amoral, with us in one camp, and all other life in another. If the
physicists, chemists, biologists, anatomists, paleontologists, and as-
tronomers can provide us few comforts in an expansive human
uniqueness, then surely the philosophers can afford us safe and sole
haven within moraled walls.
Francis Fukuyama apparently does not think so. For he grounds
his argument, in The Great Disruption, on theory and evidence that
modem human morality reflects the relentless influence of natural se-
lection.' He is not the first to argue that morality cannot be fully un-
5. All species are unique, of course, by definition. But we have generally preferred to
believe, pace Orwell, that some species are more unique than others, and that our own
uniqueness is - well - unique.
6. Species as diverse as chimpanzees and crows have demonstrated the abilities not only
to use tools, but to fashion them from raw materials. See, e.g., Yukimaru Sugiyama, Tool
Use by Wild Chimpanzees, 367 NATURE 327 (1994); Gavin R. Hunt, Manufacture and Use of
Hook-Tools by New Caledonian Crows, 379 NATURE 249 (1996).
7. A recent study addressing all accumulated reports of chimpanzee cultural transmis-
sion made patent that we are not alone within the boundaries we have staked (at least so
long as we avoid conveniently ad hoc definitions of culture that might require, for example,
the painting of still ifes in acrylic). See Frans B. M. de Waal, Cultural Primatology Comes of
Age, 399 NATURE 635 (1999); A. Whiten et al., Cultures in Chimpanzees, 399 NATURE 682
(1999).
8. To be sure, it is a grand mistake to think (as many apparently do) that the biology of
behavior is about genes for this behavior or that, present in some portion of the population
and absent elsewhere. As will be discussed further below, cutting edge behavioral biology
incorporates far more important, far subtler, far more flexible, and far less reductionistic
influences on behavior than that. Nonetheless, population-wide patterns in moral senti-
ments are predictably consistent with the knowable effects of evolutionary processes on the
human mind. As Arnhart puts it, "Human beings have a natural moral sense that emerges
as a joint product of moral emotions such as sympathy and anger and moral principles such
as kinship and reciprocity," as a function of evolutionary history. LARRY ARNHART,
DARwINIAN NATURAL RIGHT: THE BIOLOGICAL ETHICS OF HUMAN NATURE 7 (1998).
2076 [Vol. 98:2072
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derstood without a biological foundation (as he would be the first to
point out).' But where Fukuyama makes important original contribu-
tions is in his willingness to explore several possible implications, for
tomorrow's questions about the human future, of evolution's effects
on human morality. This Review will discuss the principal implica-
tions Fukuyama sees, and suggest several others in the legal arena.
What are morals, after all, but information-processing patterns that tend to bias behavior
in this way rather than that way? If those information-processing patterns tend to bias be-
havior in similar ways, on average, across a species, in contexts likely to be long encountered
throughout evolutionary history, they are likely to be the subject of selection pressures,
which favor some outcomes more than others, and thus favor psychological mechanisms
leading to adaptive responses more than others. To the extent these are even slightly herita-
ble, the historically more adaptive psychological predispositions will tend to predominate
over the less adaptive ones.
For a discussion of recent work attempting to locate moral information processing
within particular portions of the human brain, see, for example, Steven W. Anderson et al.,
Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Damage in Human Prefrontal
Cortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1032 (1999); and Raymond J. Dolan, On the Neurology
of Morals, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 927 (1999).
9. Fukuyama is preceded by many evolutionists. Among the sources that consider the
relationship between biology and morality are RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF
MORAL SYSTEMS (1987); RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, DARWINISM AND HUMAN AFFAIRS
(1979); ARNHART, supra note 8; BIOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS (Jane
Maienschein & Michael Ruse eds., 1999); DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS
(1991); CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN (1871); DANIEL C. DENNETT,
DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE (1995); FRANS B.
M. DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS AND
OTHER ANIMALS (1996); EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS (Matthew H. Nitecki & Doris V. Nitecki
eds., 1993); INVESTIGATING THE BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN MORALITY
(James P. Hurd ed., 1996); ROBERT J. MCSHEA, MORALITY AND HUMAN NATURE: A NEW
ROUTE TO ETHICAL THEORY (1990); OSTRACISM: A SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL
PHENOMENON (Margaret Gruter & Roger D. Masters eds., 1986); LEWIS PETRINOVICH,
HUMAN EVOLUTION, REPRODUCTION, AND MORALITY 25 (1995); RICHARD POSNER, THE
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999); G.E. PUGH, THE BIOLOGICAL
ORIGIN OF HUMAN VALUES (1977); R.J. RICHARDS, DARWIN AND THE EMERGENCE OF
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF MIND AND BEHAVIOR (1989); MAr RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS
OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1996); MICHAEL
RUSE, TAKING DARWIN SERIOUSLY: A NATURALISTIC APPROACH To PHILOSOPHY
(1998); THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW (Roger D. Masters &
Margaret Gruter eds., 1992); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993); ROBERT
WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
(1994); C.J. Cela-Conde, The Challenge of Evolutionary Ethics, 1 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 293
(1986); Dennis L. Krebs, The Evolution of Moral Behaviors, in HANDBOOK OF
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES, AND APPLICATIONS (Charles Crawford ed.,
1998); Roger D. Masters, Evolutionary Biology and Natural Right: Leo Strauss, Natural Sci-
ence and Political Philosophy, in THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: A STRAUSSIAN
PERSPECTIVE 49 (Kenneth Deutsch & Walter Soffer eds., 1987, corrected edition); RJ.
Richards, A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics, 1 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 265 (1986); Michael Ruse
& Edward 0. Wilson, Moral Philosophy as Applied Science, 61 PHIL. 173 (1986); R. Trigg,
Evolutionary Ethics, 1 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 325 (1986); Edward 0. Wilson, The Biological
Basis of Morality, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 53 (April 1998). For concise overviews of the re-
surgent interest in the influence of biology on human morality, see Jane Maienschein &
Michael Ruse, Introduction, in BIOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS, supra, at 1, and
Phillip R. Sloan, From Natural Law to Evolutionary Ethics in Enlightenment French Natural
History, in BIOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS, supra, at 52; WRIGHT, supra, at
327-44.
HeinOnline  -- 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2077 1999-2000
Michigan Law Review
II. THEMES OF THE GREATDISRUPTION
In Fukuyama's view, maintaining social order in the face of tech-
nological and economic change is one of the greatest challenges facing
information age democracies today (p. 10). Fukuyama's main con-
cern, in helping us to face this challenge, is that we bridge disciplines
and understand not only the sources of social disorder but also the
processes by which social order is reconstituted. Those "renorming"
processes include, he argues, not only the traditional and better-
known forms of hierarchical, top-down norm creation, from govern-
mental, religious, and community authorities, but also spontaneous,
bottom-up renorming, which bubbles up independently of hierarchical
impositions.
Developing this argument requires, and Fukuyama provides, an
extended look at the relationship between hierarchical (formal) and
spontaneous (informal) sources of order. It is here, in arguing for the
probability, existence, and importance of spontaneous renorming, that
Fukuyama draws not only on history and economics, but also on evo-
lutionary biology, and biologically informed approaches to psychology
and anthropology.
The book is significant for lawyers for three reasons. First, legal
policymakers are, in part, in the business of combating social disorder;
so a deeper understanding of both its multiple causes and the multiple
ways in which order is reestablished may aid their efforts. Second, the
work complements and extends recent legal scholarship that addresses
the importance, origin, and development of norms (as the result of
self-organization and sometimes surprising decisions of decentralized
individuals") and also addresses the centrality, to an understanding of
10. See, e.g., Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996);
Symposium, Law and the Legal Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1998); Symposium, The Le-
gal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1497 (1998); Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic
Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. (1998). A small sampling of the burgeoning literature
includes Lisa Bernstein, SOCIAL NORMS AND DEFAULT RULES ANALYSIS, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993); Robert Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory: Thickening the
"Self' in "Self-Interest" in SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES IN CONTEXT (D. J. Galilean ed., 1995);
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibitions as More than Prices: The Economic Analysis
of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL
PERSPECrIVES 153 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995); Robert C.
Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998);
Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms
and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390 (1994); Christine Jolls, Behavioral
Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998); Christine
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998);
Russell Korobkin, Inertia And Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power
of Default Rules And Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998); Bailey Kuklin, Evolution,
Politics, and Law (March 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Donald C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A
Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and So-
cial Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Develop-
2078 [Vol. 98:2072
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norms, of game-theoretic analyses of how selfish interests can bring
cooperative outcomes. Third, the book usefully demonstrates, in a
political science parallel to law, ways in which the tools of behavioral
biology are both accessible to non-biologists, and useful in their aca-
demic enterprises. In that demonstration, there are a number of im-
portant lessons, taken up in Part IV below.
Fukuyama has three main points, reflected in the three main Parts
of his book. In Part One, entitled "The Great Disruption," Fukuyama
argues that the transition from the industrial age to the information
age has been a mixed blessing. Specifically, when mental labor in-
creasingly displaced physical labor, and services began to displace
manufacturing as a source of wealth, this adversely affected our social
relations and moral lives (pp. 3-4). For example, inexpensive informa-
tion technology leads both to an increase in individualism and to the
"miniaturization of community" (p. 91). It "erodes the boundaries of
long-established cultural communities" with cheap but relentless tele-
vision, radio, fax, and e-mail (p. 3), and it decreases meaningful, long-
term, and truly engaged associations between people (pp. 5-6). As
Fukuyama puts it, "The same innovation that increases productivity or
launches a new industry undermines an existing community or makes
an entire way of life obsolete" (p. 282).
This, in turn, increases social disorder. Or relatedly, as Fukuyama
prefers to frame it, this causes a decline in social capital.2 Social capi-
tal, the neglected cousin of physical capital (such as machines) and
human capital (such as know-how), is the set of informal values or
norms shared among members of a group that permit cooperation
ment, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997); Eric A. Posner, Law, Eco-
nomics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541 (1998);
Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Law
and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1679 (1998); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Loss Aversion
and Involuntary Transfers of Title, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL
PERSPECrIVES (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995); Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997); Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of
Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1747 (1998). On the self-organization of
complexity in law, see generally J. B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dy-
namical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern
Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996); J. B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Com-
plexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for
Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996).
11. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World A Generative Ap-
proach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997); JACK HIRSHLEIFER,
Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation versus Conflict Strategies, in
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR IN ADVERSITY 211-73 (1987).
12. A brief history of the coinage and changing applications of the term appears on pp.
19-20.
2079May 2000]
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among them.13 Such norms include, for example, reliability, honesty,
and reciprocity.14 The "Great Disruption," of the book's title, is
Fukuyama's term for the dramatic (and in his view largely negative)
changes in social values, between roughly the mid 1960s and the early
1990s, that both reflected and contributed to a sharp, contemporane-
ous decline in social capital (p. 4).
Of course, empirically tracing fluctuations in social capital is no
simple task. Fukuyama attempts to estimate changes in the supply of
social capital, across several decades, by advancing a variety of posi-
tive and negative measures.15 For the former, he uses data from sur-
veys on the subjects of trust, values, and civil society, which correlate
positively with the presence of social capital. For the latter, he princi-
pally employs data from national statistical agencies chronicling tradi-
tional indicators of social dysfunction. These track and evidence, he
argues, the comparative absence of social capital. Such indicators in-
clude increased crime, decline of kinship as a source of social cohe-
sion, decline in fertility, decline in the institution of marriage, in-
creased illegitimacy, and the decline in trust - both privately (trust
placed in individuals) and publicly (trust afforded institutions).16 The
data suggest that total social capital indeed declined between the
1960s and the 1990s, and that it did so more rapidly than it had during
earlier periods of shifting norms.17
13. P. 16. In other words, as Fukuyama explains, social capital can be variously under-
stood to be: the subset of norms that constitutes society's stock of shared values, p. 14; a co-
operative norm that has become embedded in the relationships among a group of people,
pp. 27-28; and informal norms promoting cooperative behavior, p. 28. Thus, families, for
example, are an important source of social capital. Pp. 16-17. James Coleman, the sociolo-
gist who is most responsible for bringing the term social capital into broader use, defined it
as "the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social organization
and that are useful for the cognitive or social development of a child." P. 36 (citing JAMES S.
COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 300 (1990)).
14. As Fukuyama illustrates:
If members of the group come to expect that others will behave reliably and honestly, then
they will come to trust one another. Trust is like a lubricant that makes the running of any
group or organization more efficient.... Trust is a key by-product of the cooperative social
norms that constitute social capital. If people can be counted on to keep commitments,
honor norms of reciprocity, and avoid opportunistic behavior then groups will form more
readily and those that do form will be able to achieve common purposes more efficiently.
Pp. 16,49.
15. His analysis is anything but parochial. He examines data not only from the United
States, but also from the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Japan, as well as Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Norway, Finland, and
Korea. See, e.g., pp. 27-60.
16. Fukuyama reconciles the apparent overall decline in trust and community with data
suggesting an overall increase in group membership by arguing that the "radius of trust" has
shortened, and the number of people within one's community circle has lowered, yielding a
net decline. P. 88.
17. A discussion of methods appears on pp. 20-24. Fukuyama finds that, starting in
roughly 1965, virtually all developed countries experienced a simultaneous and rapid up-
swing in negative measures of social capital. P. 27. Crime rates in the United States, for ex-
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Apparently, this matters. Declining social capital is bad,
Fukuyama argues, not simply because cooperation is normatively nice,
but because the kinds of cooperation social capital fosters are eco-
nomically efficient. Specifically, social capital increases aggregate
economic wealth by facilitating gains from trade, as individuals con-
tract more with those parties with whom they share norms than they
do with others."8 Social capital is therefore critical to a successful
economy. So critical is social capital, in fact, that Fukuyama describes
it as a prerequisite not only for all forms of group endeavor in a mod-
em society but for civil democratic society itself. 9
In Part Two of the book, entitled "On the Genealogy of Morals,"
Fukuyama essentially addresses the question: If social capital is both
crucial and declining, can it be reestablished and preserved, and if so,
by what process? This inquiry requires him to explore, at some length,
the sources of order in human society. A great many who have
thought on the subject of this question apparently tend to believe that
the reconstitution of social order is possible exclusively or primarily
through hierarchical authoritarian interventions from political and re-
ligious spheres of influence (p. 6).
In contrast, Fukuyama argues that social order, once disrupted,
tends to be reconstituted, even in the absence of hierarchically im-
posed interventions, such as laws, regulations, holy texts, or bureau-
cratic organization charts. Capitalist societies are not destined to be-
come morally poorer as they become materially wealthier." For social
ample, declined slightly in the mid-1980s and then jumped up again in the late 1980s, peak-
ing around 1991-92. P. 31. And this same pattern is evident in nearly all other non-Asian
developed countries. P. 31. Because families are an important source of social capital, the
dramatic shifts in social norms concerning reproduction and gender relations, specifically the
pill-induced sexual revolution, the rise of feminism in the 1960s and the 1970s, falling mar-
riage rates, and increasing divorce and illegitimacy rates "introduced massive changes not
just in households but in offices, factories, neighborhoods, voluntary associations, education,
even the military." P. 36; see also pp. 92-111.
18. As Fukuyama puts it:
[S]ocial capital produces wealth and is therefore of economic value to a national econ-
omy .... [It enables individuals to] amplify their own power and abilities by following co-
operative rules that constrain their freedom of choice, allow them to communicate with oth-
ers, and coordinate their actions. Social virtues like honesty, reciprocity, and keeping
commitments are not choice worthy just as ethical values; they also have a tangible dollar
value and help the groups who practice them achieve shared ends.
P. 14.
19. Pp. 14,20. Here Fukuyama follows the influential views of Putnam. See Robert D.
Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. OF DEMOCRACY 65 (1995)
(although the seeds of the idea are in de Tocqueville). Putnam has helped generate a large
literature in both political and legal scholarship, in which questions of civil society, "civic
republicanism," and communitarianism currently form a major theme. Almost none of this
literature (apart from Fukuyama) pays attention to the evolved psychology of social rela-
tions, which any attempts to "reinvigorate" civic participation inevitably must engage and
use.
20. For Fukuyama, it is technological change that disrupts social order, not capitalism
itself. In his view, capitalism, while both a source of disorder and order, is probably a net
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order can and will emerge spontaneously, even in the most technologi-
cally sophisticated parts of the global economy, as a bottom-up phe-
nomenon - as a function of informal, unpublished, evolving norms in
communities.
This obtains, Fukuyama argues, for two reasons, both revealed in
the light of disciplinary integration. First, our species-typical human
psychology is intrinsically predisposed, by biological heritage, to cre-
ate moral rules and cooperative social order.21 This follows from the
predictable effects of evolutionary processes on inclinations that his-
torically yielded individual advantage through the mutual gains social
interaction can afford. The adaptive advantage these inclinations pro-
vided leave us psychologically uncomfortable when social order is dis-
rupted.l There is therefore a dynamic interplay between the erosion
of norms and the process of renorming, as reconstitution springs from
our innate human nature to seek cooperation and moral rules that
bind us together in ways often facilitating mutual gain. Second, we are
also by nature rational, and rational calculation will make us realize
the value of cooperation, prompting us to be, in fact, more coopera-
tive. In three chapters at the heart of the book - Eight, Nine, and
Ten - Fukuyama roots each of these two reasons (one less cognitive,
the other more so) in modem evolutionary biology, having described
the study of how order arises from self-organization as "one of the
most interesting and important intellectual developments of our time"
(p. 6).
To be sure, Fukuyama does not claim that spontaneous order can
solve all collective action problems. And his discussions of the limits
of spontaneous order, when hierarchical interventions are necessary to
increase and maintain social capital, are among the most intellectually
honest (if necessarily untidy) parts of the book (Chapter 13). But the
fact that hierarchically imposed norms are often necessary does not
undermine Fukuyama's principal point: spontaneous sources of norms
are far more important to our understanding of human norms, and to
the maintenance of a thriving economy, than previously accepted.'
generator of norms. The very thing that makes capitalism thrive - self-interest - leads to
cooperation. See, e.g., pp. 253,261-62.
21. "Human beings by nature are social creatures with certain built-in, natural capabili-
ties for solving problems of social cooperation and inventing more rules to constrain individ-
ual choice." P. 231; see also p. 137.
22. This argument is summarized most succinctly on p. 6. See also p. 137 ("The situation
of normlessness - what Durkheim labeled anomie - is intensely uncomfortable for us, and
we will seek to create new rules to replace the ones that have been undercut. If technology
makes certain old forms of community difficult to sustain, then we will seek out new ones,
and we will use our reason to negotiate different arrangements that will suit our underlying
interests, needs, and passions.").
23. For a discussion on how the presence of spontaneous renorming processes can pro-
vide an emotional basis for the development and maintenance of hierarchical institutions
specialized in norm-making, see infra Section III.D.
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These spontaneous sources of norms, Fukuyama claims, could theo-
retically help to counteract the Great Disruption of social norms (and
thus social capital) occasioned by the transition from the industrial age
to the information age.
In Part Three of the book, entitled "The Great Reconstruction,"
Fukuyama assesses the extent to which that theoretical possibility is
probable. He argues that understanding how evolutionary processes
have affected human behavior affords us some comfort in predicting
that humankind will adapt to disruption with reconstitution, and that a
healthy and stable social order will once again emerge.
Thus, the good news is that the social disruption is not here to stay,
as the inevitable end of the Enlightenment, secular humanism, capi-
talism, and the like. Social and moral disorder is reversible through
renorming processes. The bad news is that the reversal is not strictly
inevitable (p. 282). For while "decentralized groups of people will
tend to produce order if left to their own devices" (p. 253), this is a
tendency, not an inevitability.
Fukuyama argues that successful and beneficial renorming proc-
esses involve not only the spontaneous renorming of a species predis-
posed to renorm, but also, ideally, two parallel effects. These include
the effects of hierarchical impositions (such as state police powers and
religious admonishments) as well as the efforts of rational individuals
who, having recognized that their communal lives have deteriorated,
"work actively to renorm their society through discussion, argument,
cultural argument, and even culture wars" (p. 250). That is, at the
same time that Fukuyama argues that spontaneous sources of order
are probable, he also argues that we cannot passively rely on sponta-
neous renorming alone. There are still (many readers will be relieved
to learn) important roles for careful public planning and hierarchical
renorming. Specifically: "Rational hierarchical authority, in the form
of government and formal law, will have to serve as supplements ....
State authority in the form of formal law will always be a necessary
complement and corrective... to the extended order of human coop-
eration."'24
Fortunately, argues Fukuyama, the early stages of reconstitution
are already visible today. Fukuyama notes, for example, that rates of
24. P. 221. Discussing the probable persistence of hierarchical sources of order even in
informal networks, Fukuyama states:
We can argue that networks will become more important in the technological world of the
future and yet concede that there are at least three reasons why hierarchy will remain a nec-
essary part of organization for the foreseeable future. First, we cannot take the existence of
networks and their underlying social capital for granted, and where they don't exist, hierar-
chy may be the only possible form of organization. Second, hierarchy is often functionally
necessary for organizations to achieve their goals. And third, people by nature like to or-
ganize themselves hierarchically.
P. 222.
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increase in crime, divorce, illegitimacy, and distrust have reversed or
slowed substantially, particularly in the United States, but also in
many of the other countries he identifies as having experienced sharp
increases in social disorder in the 1960s (p. 271). He sees these data as
evidence that "the Great Disruption has run its course and that the
process of renorming has already begun" (p. 271). And, because in-
ternalized rules and norms of behavior are preconditions of successful
reconstitution, Fukuyama predicts that "the world of the twenty-first
century will depend heavily on such informal norms" (p. 7). We will
see this in human organizations that show less reliance on formal hier-
archies and more reliance on the shared values inherent in informal
networks.
III. LESSONS AND CHALLENGES
The Great Disruption is forcefully written, original, and engaging.
The tackled topic - predicting the social contours of the full informa-
tion age society - is important. By raising and confronting the ques-
tions of how we can maintain and increase social capital in an in-
creasingly fractured social world, Fukuyama identifies problems, the
implications of which we may not have fully recognized, and tenders a
framework for thinking about and confronting them. His book pro-
vides us not only with an interesting theory to explain recent disrup-
tions in social order, but also with a better sense of the processes by
which social capital - a key component of social order - is created
and maintained.
One of the questions that I think the book does not squarely con-
front, however, concerns the issue of net effects. That is, we now
know that technological change, for all the benefits it offers, can
prompt declines in valuable social capital, thereby imposing costs.
Fukuyama clearly considers these costs, were they to remain unreme-
died, unacceptable. But remedies - replenishing social capital -
also cost, presumably. Is there no point at which the magnitude of the
gains from technology simply outweighs the costs, even if some quan-
tum of lost social capital were never replenished?
While I am confident that Fukuyama has important things to say
about this question, it still remains a question. But it is not the kind of
question on which I wish to focus here. In my view, the real signifi-
cance of the book is more in its method than its substance. Behavioral
biology is the linchpin of Fukuyama's analysis, and of increasing im-
portance in the legal arena, and it is therefore on Fukuyama's use of
biology that I wish to concentrate.
25. After all, to label something a "Disruption" is, I think, to offer a value judgment
rather than a mere description, identifying a normatively bad interference with what had
previously been better.
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Fukuyama has a clear vision of the importance of integrating life
and social science perspectives into public policy analysis. But he does
more, in this book, than simply turn to the evolutionary sciences (such
as ethology, primatology, behavioral biology, evolutionary psychology,
and evolutionary anthropology) for insights into human morality and
future social ordering. He goes beyond integration and boldly at-
tempts application, in the context of some very pressing issues. And
this works better in some instances than in others.'
Fukuyama's invocations of biology reflect a current and sophisti-
cated familiarity (to which the notes to Chapters 9 and 10, in particu-
lar, attest). He gives a broad and readable account of basic principles
in modem evolutionary biology, drawing knowledgeably, for example,
on the works of leading primatologists, such as Frans de Waal and
Richard Wrangham. He neatly integrates accounts of the supplanta-
tion, by William Hamilton's and George Williams's theories, of earlier
theories of group selection and the origins of altruistic behavior (p.
161). He provides explanations for the counterintuitive propositions
that the self-serving orientation of genes will often lead to genuinely
cooperative, sometimes even "altruistic," forms of behavior. And, to
make the argument from biology comprehensible, he provides a com-
petent and engaging survey of topics ranging from natural selection,
sexual selection, and kin selection, on one hand, to cooperation and
reciprocal altruism, on the other.
This is not easy to do, particularly in a comparatively short space,
but Fukuyama does it rather well.27 It is one of his great strengths that
26. It bears emphasis that Fukuyama's approach is a sharp break from prevailing as-
sumptions that philosophy and psychology can, either alone or in concert, provide adequate
explanation for human morality and norms. It is also a sharp break from the recent trend to
use game theoretic models of competing norms, analyzed solely at the cultural level of
transmission, to explain dominant ones. It is an argument for both the utility and centrality
of evolutionary theory in understanding complex human phenomena.
27. Pp. 154-86. For introductions to these subjects written explicitly for lawyers, see
Timothy H. Goldsmith & Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Biology and Behavior: A Brief
Overview and Some Important Concepts, 39 JuRIMETRIcS J. 131 (1999) (addressing core
principles of behavioral biology); Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Intro-
duction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1126-57 (1997) (Part I offers
"A Primer in Law-Relevant Evolutionary Biology"); Owen D. Jones, Law and Biology:
Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior, 8 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 167 (1997) (dis-
cussing integration of life science and social science perspectives); Owen D. Jones, Sex, Cul-
ture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827,
841-53 (1999) (addressing core principles of behavioral biology).
Book-length popular accounts of behavioral biology include MATT RIDLEY, THE RED
QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE (1994) and ROBERT WRIGHT,
THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 55-107
(1994). Accessible textbooks include JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLU-
TIONARY APPROACH (6th ed. 1998); DAVID BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: THE
NEW SCIENCE OF THE MIND (1999); TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN,
BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN NATURE (forthcoming 2000); ROBERT TRIVERS,
SOCiAL EVOLUTION (1985).
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he sees the large-scale connectedness between historically separated
aspects of the human condition. For example, he understands and
manages to convey why there are biological bases to social emotions
generally, and to moral sentiments and rule-following specifically.'
Moreover, he weaves into his discussion information concerning the
biological bases for status seeking, anger, guilt, pride, shame, jealousy,
love of children, and the like.29 He sees the deep commonalities be-
tween biological and economic reasoning, without naively supposing
that these are without significant points of departure." He sees the in-
fluence of biology on family relationships.3 And, most significantly,
he has a manifest awareness of the centrality of evolutionary theory in
putting all of this in a coherent perspective.
There are a number of different lessons in this approach. The first
lesson is that one cannot think accurately and comprehensively about
important issues of human behavior without some sense of the histori-
cal, evolutionary contexts in which that behavior plays out. Period.
To attempt otherwise is as silly as trying to explain modem geopoliti-
cal boundaries without any attention to history. The past shapes the
present and constrains the future. To the extent that law is fundamen-
tally about shifting human behavior in directions it might not other-
wise go, the more historically accurate and contextualized framework
that biology affords may help us to pursue our legal policies more effi-
ciently.
Second, the general moral sentiments, including shame, guilt, sen-
sitivity to injustice, a taste for reciprocity, and moralistic aggression,
are rooted (like other emotions, such as sexual attraction and jealousy,
love of offspring, distaste for incest and rape, and anger) in
information-processing pathways that natural selection has influ-
enced.32 To the extent that morality and emotions are relevant to law,
28. See, e.g., pp. 149,175-79,184-85. For more on these topics, see Owen D. Jones, Law,
Emotions, and Behavioral Biology, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 283 (1999).
29. See, e.g., p. 184.
30. See pp. 161-62 (describing both "methodological borrowing" and differences be-
tween the fields). Richard Posner has explored a number of important connections between
biological and economic reasoning. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992),
where he observes that "there are illuminating analytical parallels between the biological
and economic approaches ... tne two approaches are mutually reinforcing and may in com-
bination constitute a more powerful theory than either by itself." Id. at 88. The economist
Jack Hirshleifer was among the first to observe the potential for integrating biological and
economic insights. See, e.g., Jack Hirshleifer, Economics from a Biological Viewpoint, 20
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1977). And Paul Rubin, among others, continues in this important tradi-
tion. See, e.g., Paul Rubin, The State of Nature and the Evolution of Political Preferences, 3
AM. L. & ECON. REv. (forthcoming 2001).
31. See, e.g., pp. 95-101 (describing biological underpinnings of family).
32. Darwin essentially argued this in The Descent of Man. See DARWIN, supra note 9,
chs. 3, 5. It is interesting to note that John Rawls, in Theory of Justice, also speculated that
there may be evolutionary origins to his basic claims about moral principles. JOHN RANVLS,
THEORY OF JUSTICE 502-03 (1971).
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the further study of biobehavioral influences on their pan-human,
nonrandom patterns will provide a richer understanding of the recip-
rocal relationship between morality, culture, and law.
Third, integrating biology into discussions of politics, law, and
other complex human behaviors is, while highly useful, at times ex-
tremely challenging. The following Sections describe four of these
challenges.
A. The Non-Normativeness of Norms
One of the most challenging aspects of discussing the relevance of
behavioral biology to human behavior, and particularly to morality
and norms, is to leave norms out of it. By that, I mean that one must
simultaneously acknowledge the evolutionary influences on the form
and content of norms, and avoid concluding that the norms themselves
are normatively good or bad, on the basis of biology alone.
Put another way: explanation is not justification, and description is
not prescription. The realms of the descriptive "is" and the normative
"ought" are logically separate. To combine them is to commit what is
known as the Naturalistic Fallacy - arguing that what is is what ought
to be." (Committing this error gave Social Darwinists - forever - an
aptly deserved bad name, as they misappropriated Darwinian ideas,
and argued that the upper classes were upper by merit, and deserved
to remain there, by biology.) The results of biological processes can-
not be described as good or bad without identifying and injecting a
value outside biology that makes us think them so. For example, we
now have a great deal of information concerning biobehavioral influ-
ences on sexual aggression and on child abuse.' But that need never
lead us to conclude that sexual aggression or child abuse are permissi-
ble.35
33. The term was coined in G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 62, 89-110 (Thomas
Baldwin ed., 2d ed. 1993), but the concept traces to the 1888 edition of DAVID HUME, A
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978).
The reciprocal and less recognized error is the one more commonly committed. One com-
mits the Moralistic Fallacy whenever one attempts to reason (usually implicitly rather than
explicitly): that the way something ought to be is the way that it is; that explanation follows
inclination; and that facts follow preferences. For discussion of the Moralistic Fallacy, see
Charles Crawford, The Theory of Evolution in the Study of Human Behaviour. An Intro-
duction and Overview, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES
AND APPLICATIONS 9 (Charles Crawford & Dennis L. Krebs eds., 1998); Jones, Sex, Culture,
and the Biology of Rape, supra note 27, at 893-95; Charles Crawford, Book Review, 20
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAv. 137, 139 (1999) (reviewing Uniting Psychology and Biology:
Integrative Perspectives on Human Development).
34. See, e.g., Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 27; Jones, Sex, Culture,
and the Biology of Rape, supra note 27.
35. We could, therefore, maintain that the descriptive and normative realms are to be
held completely separate. Of course, the matter is considerably more complicated than that.
When we have a normative goal to change behavior, that goal is furthered by greater knowl-
edge of the pathways by which the behavior arises. So much is clear. Less clear is the point,
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Fukuyama meets this challenge of disentangling is from ought and
demonstrates it is possible to invoke biology without claiming that
what is biological is necessarily good. While he happens to believe
that our evolved predispositions toward cooperation are good, it is be-
cause he values (not surprisingly) the effects of such cooperation on
the economy and political order. Thus, it is because he values effi-
ciency, increases in wealth, and political, civil, and democratic stability
that he finds the particular biological predispositions to which he re-
fers to be fortunate. This is not at all the same thing as claiming (as
some critics incorrectly presume that those who invoke biology auto-
matically claim) that all biological predispositions are fortunate, sim-
ply because they have evolved.
B. Adapting to Adaptation
A second challenge to future discussions of the biology of human
psychological predispositions concerns the nature of adaptation. It
turns out that it is not a simple matter to differentiate adaptations
from by-products of adaptations. 6 This is hard enough when biolo-
gists examine anatomy, but it is particularly difficult when animal psy-
chology is involved. Information-processing patterns are not easily
observable, they interact with one another, and they often include, in
any event, nested algorithms sensitive to variations in environmental
stimuli. But it is even more difficult to predict how given human psy-
chological adaptations will play out in the future.
Fukuyama predicts, for example, that humans will successfully re-
norm, in a way that preserves social capital, because evolutionary pro-
cesses have rendered normlessness uncomfortable for us, and have left
us psychologically predisposed to cooperate and solve collective action
problems. While I share the author's hope for a successful and renor-
med human future, I am not yet persuaded that biology affords us
quite the degree of confidence that Fukuyama thinks it does. For ex-
ample, in Fukuyama's view:
[K]nowing that there are important natural and spontaneous sources of
social order is not a minor insight. It suggests that culture and moral val-
ues will continue to evolve in ways that will allow people to adapt to the
which some have argued, that while the "is" does not strictly dictate the "ought," it may be
inefficient and silly to generate an ought without some working knowledge of even poten-
tially surmountable constraints on the "is." For example, Lewis Petrinovich argues that
"The nature of what is should be understood as a factor to enable us to frame the ought in
better terms." PETRINOVICH, supra note 9, at 25. This line of reasoning (how can you have
anything but wildly irrational values if you are ignorant of facts) is also explored in
DENNETr, supra note 9, at 467-68.
36. An adaptation is a heritable feature of an organism enabling it to survive, and to
increase the copies of its genes that appear in the next generation, in its natural environ-
ment, better than if it lacked the feature.
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changing technological and economic conditions they face and that this
spontaneous evolution will interact with hierarchical authority to pro-
duce an 'extended order of human cooperation'.... [W]e should pre-
sume that people will continue to use their innate capabilities and reason
to evolve rules that serve their long-term interests and needs. [p. 244]
I am certain that Fukuyama is not arguing that reason alone, or
evolved behavioral predispositions alone, are sufficient to guarantee
or nearly guarantee a successful future. But I am equally certain that
Fukuyama is arguing that our evolved behavioral predispositions very
significantly increase the probability that such a future will obtain. I'm
not sure this is right. I find it more difficult than Fukuyama does to
conclude that knowledge of evolutionary processes affords us comfort
in believing that humankind is very likely to meet the challenges of
technological change.37
I have four reasons for reservation. First, 99.9% of all species that
ever lived are extinct.3 Presumably, many of them were well-adapted
to their environments before some external change changed every-
thing. The odds are against the long-term persistence of any species,
let alone one as young and volatile as our own, encountering novel
changes of our own creation, that we generate faster than generations.
Second, evolutionary processes adapt species to previously pre-
vailing, not future, environments. True, we are a species for whom
behavioral adaptability (or "plasticity") is itself an evolved adaptation.
We are more adaptable than many other species, and our adaptability
flows principally from the powerful cognitive capacities that enable us
to crunch more data, in more sophisticated and nuanced fashion, than
other creatures. So, to the extent that thinking hard about the present
and future can help us turn the present into a viable future, our cogni-
tive abilities may help us secure some endlessly renormed future. But
this much we already knew. The optimism Fukuyama offers comes
from the hope that our current brains are already up to future chal-
lenges, not from the confidence that natural selection will somehow
shape our brains to successfully meet future challenges.
The distinction is important. We know that natural selection can-
not design future-looking adaptations. The process is, after all, a
mindless one - without foresight by definition. Natural selection ap-
pears never to have designed, nor do biologists expect it ever can de-
sign, an all-purpose adaptability mechanism designed to ensure adap-
tation to current or future social or technological change, when then-
prevailing conditions differ from ancestral ones, in which current ad-
37. To be sure, Fukuyama is not naive enough to think that anything "guarantees that
there will be upturns in the cycle [of social order]." P. 282 (emphasis added). A quite dis-
tinct optimism, however, just shy of confidence, pervades the book.
38. See DAVID RAUP, EXTINcTION: BAD GENES OR BAD LUcK? 3-4 (1991) (reporting
the estimate).
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aptations were designed. To the extent that features of our species or
others function well in current environments, it is either because the
environments have not changed materially from the environments in
which those features evolved, or because those features, which were
adaptive in ancestral environments for one reason, turn out also to be
adaptive in a different, current environment for another.
Third, the animal kingdom provides daily examples of adaptations
that run aground on environmental changes. Moths do circle lamp-
lights, because the moon and stars used to provide reliable reference
points for navigation. Squirrels vocally harass hunters, whose guns af-
ford novel ways of killing them. People overconsume highly caloric
foods, which contain energy concentrations never before encountered
in nature. And humans continue to be sexually attracted to (and
sexually jealous of) people they know are (and perhaps want to be)
using contraception. An adaptation is only as good as the environ-
ment in which it continues to provide advantage - and historical ad-
aptations can, during environmental shifts, prove downright deleteri-
ous.39 Some of the evolved predispositions we manifest, therefore,
such as aggressive responses to threats to status, may decrease the
probability of a secure future precisely because they encounter novel
technological features, from street-common handguns to interconti-
nental ballistic missiles.
Fourth, if our human psychology turns out not to be well-adapted
to the technological environment we are creating for ourselves, we
know that natural selection is unlikely to yield responsive adaptations
anytime soon. Soon, by evolutionary standards, is measured in gen-
erations, which for humans are rather long, compared with the rapid-
ity of technological changes. For the distribution within a population
to manifest a "new" trait soon, a heritable trait must have arisen
(through mutation or genetic recombination), and it must provide -
in the then existing environment - a very pronounced reproductive
advantage over alternative traits contemporaneously existing.4" Such
circumstances are generally rare, but even more so for a species like
ours with small brood size.
39. This can lead to something I refer to as "time shifted rationality" (to distinguish it
from "bounded rationality") - the temporal mismatch of historically adaptive behavior and
modem environments. See Owen D. Jones, Law, Behavioral Economics, and Evolution,
Paper presented at The Olin Conference: Evolution and Legal Theory, Georgetown
University Law Center (April 16, 1999), and the Annual Scholarship Conference of the
Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (Sept. 24, 1999) (on file with author).
40. For an example of the strength of selection pressures necessary to cause speedy
changes in morphology, see Jonathan B. Losos et al., Contingency and Determinism in Repli-
cated Adaptive Radiations of Island Lizards, 279 SCIENCE 2115 (1998); Gretchen Vogel, For
Island Lizards, History Repeats Itself, 279 SCIENcE 2043 (1998).
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C. Our Dispositions Toward Predispositions
A third challenge concerns the subtle interactions of genes and en-
vironment. Fukuyama is far too sophisticated to put stock in the ri-
diculous notion that there can ever be a meaningful discussion of
whether a given behavior is exclusively the province of nature or of
nurture.4' This is like debating whether the area of a rectangle is the
product of its length or its width. All biological processes, including
normal brain development, ultimately depend on rich environmental
inputs. Similarly, all environmental influences can only be perceived,
sorted, analyzed, and understood through biological, evolved proc-
esses.
At the same time, Fukuyama recognizes that the influence of bio-
behavioral predispositions is more direct, and can be spoken of more
meaningfully, in the contexts of some behaviors than others. (Com-
pare extremes: sexual behavior, for example, on one hand, with filing
an SEC disclosure statement, on the other.) This has led to a ten-
dency, presumably in the interests of verbal economy, for Fukuyama
to refer to some behaviors as being under "genetic rather than cultural
control,"42 or as being "determined not by culture but by biology."'43
I think this tendency is, though understandable, unfortunate for
two reasons. First, the use of the words "control" and "determined"
- rather than variations of the word "influence," for example - may
inadvertently reinforce the misperception that behavioral biology is
about genetic determinism. A reader who has not attempted to keep
pace with the explosion of modem biology literature, as Fukuyama
has, might fairly recoil from the impression that some significant num-
ber of complex, non-reflex human behaviors are simply unavoidable.
Second, by using language of mutual exclusivity (controlled by x
"rather than" y; determined "not by [x] but by [y]") Fukuyama over-
dichotomizes in a way few biologists would sanction." Again, this may
confuse readers.
41. See, e.g., p. 158 (discussing the interplay of nature and nurture).
42. The author describes how a variety of mother-infant interactions "appear to be un-
der genetic rather than cultural control." P. 96. See also pp. 158-59, 165.
43. P. 158 ("so too may human cultures reflect common social requirements determined
not by culture but by biology").
44. For another example, see p. 187 ("[T]he particular norms and metanorms chosen by
a given group of individuals are cultural choice, not a product of nature."). I think the dis-
tinction Fukuyama wants to draw here is not between culture and biology (or nature), but
rather between cultural vectors of trait transmission and genetic vectors of trait transmission,
both of which are biological. Culture is best considered as a fully integrated part of our biol-
ogy - both in the sense that culture reflects natural selection's influence on the human
brain, and also in the sense that cultural practices reciprocally affect human breeding pat-
terns, and thus contribute to selection pressures that ultimately affect the spread of heritable
human psychological predispositions.
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Fukuyama somewhat underemphasizes, I believe, three things he
knows, but that writers on human behavioral biology could probably
and usefully make greater efforts to underscore. First, a predisposi-
tion is not a predetermination. One of the advantages of our large
brain is that it can accommodate a very wide and highly nuanced
range of inclinations - which by measures both large and tiny can in-
crease or decrease the probabilities of various behaviors, in the face of
various circumstances. Second, biobehavioral predispositions are gen-
erally condition-dependent (that is, context-specific), not automatic 5
Third, and this point underscores the second, we are talking, in all of
this, about the evolved psychology aspect of behavioral biology, not
the behavioral genetics aspect.
The distinction is important, and rarely explicit. Behavioral ge-
netics involves efforts to trace the different behaviors of different in-
dividuals to genetic differences among them. (This is what most peo-
ple, incorrectly, think discussions of human behavioral biology are
about.) In contrast, the complementary aspect of behavioral biology,
concerning evolved or "species-typical" psychology, attempts to trace
many of the different behaviors of different individuals not to differ-
ent versions of genes, but rather to different environmental stimuli en-
countered by neurologically similar brains, sporting similar, evolved,
and contingent decisional algorithms. That is, humans bear species-
wide (in some cases sex-wide) physical, information-processing com-
monalities that have evolved to yield predispositions toward certain
behaviors in the face of certain categories and confluences of stimuli,
and predispositions toward other behaviors in other contexts.
D. Reasons for Rationality
A fourth challenge, and perhaps the one most crucial for the law at
present, concerns the relationship between rationality, its supposed
opposites, and biology. There are times, in The Great Disruption,
when Fukuyama describes both sociality and rationality as products of
human nature.46 That is, he does acknowledge, in places, that ration-
45. This means that common psychological predispositions can sometimes underlie even
cultural differences among groups, which may be the result of those predispositions proc-
essing materially different environmental circumstances. Contrast:
One of the weaknesses of any attempt to use human nature to explain phenomena like trust
and social capital is that it cannot give an account of the observable differences that exist be-
tween human groups. And so too here. The kinds of universal psychological characteristics
described earlier as the basis for social capital are sufficient to explain why there should be
social cooperation within relatively small groups, but they do not explain why different con-
temporary human societies have different radii of trust. These kinds of explanations must be
entirely cultural in nature, and often need to refer back to a society's religious heritage.
P. 240.
46. For example:
2092 [Vol. 98:2072
HeinOnline  -- 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2092 1999-2000
On the Nature of Norms
ality is itself a function of our biology. He is not consistent in this,
however. Fukuyama's approach generally demonstrates an apparent
preference for sorting behaviors on a continuum bounded by the bio-
logically influenced, at one end, and the rationally influenced, at the
other.47 In these contexts, the rational pathway to behavior is some-
how distinct from the biological pathway to behavior. It is clear why
Fukuyama wants to draw this distinction. He is attempting to con-
struct a useful taxonomy that attends to differences in the extent to
which given behaviors are rationally chosen. But I do think the dis-
tinction, as framed, is a bit misleading.
Of course, there are at least two different meanings to rational.
One describes a process of cognitive decisionmaking. The other de-
scribes the substantive end product behavior, judged by a standard ir-
respective of the process by which that behavior was generated.
(Much ink has been spilled by authors using mismatched meanings,
such that rational processes can lead to irrational outcomes, and irra-
tional processes can lead to rational outcomes.) But, whichever one of
these two common meanings Fukuyama intends (I think it is the
process-based former), it seems likely that Fukuyama over-separates
the rational from the biological.
The biological/rational distinction only makes sense if the rational
is not itself importantly biological. But of course it is. Rationality, as
a process, is not just trivially biological, in the sense that thinking and
decisionmaking happen to take place in living tissue with chemical
needs and electrical outputs. Rationality is importantly biological in
the sense that the structure of the brain is believed to contain features
evolved to facilitate precisely the kind of multiple-variable, context-
specific, calculus that increases the probability of the most adaptive
[Human beings are by nature social creatures, whose most basic drives and instincts lead
them to create moral rules that bind themselves together into communities. They are also by
nature rational, and their rationality allows them to create ways of cooperating with one an-
other spontaneously.
P. 6.
47. For example:
What we find is that order and social capital have two broad bases of support. The first is
biological, and emerges from human nature itself. There have been important recent ad-
vances in the life sciences, which have the cumulative effect of reestablishing the classical
view that human nature exists and that their nature makes humans social and political crea-
tures with great capabilities for establishing social rules. While this research in a certain
sense does not tell us anything that Aristotle didn't know, it allows us to be much more pre-
cise about the nature of human sociability and what is and is not rooted in the human ge-
nome. The second basis of support for social order is human reason, and reason's ability to
spontaneously generate solutions to problems of social cooperation.
P. 138. See also pp. 152-53, figs. 8.3 & 8.4; p. 2 4 9 ("[H]uman beings will produce moral rules
for themselves, partly because they are designed by nature to do so and partly as a result of
their pursuit of self-interest."); p. 273 ("People are social animals by nature and, in addition,
rational creators of cultural rules. Both nature and rationality ultimately support the devel-
opment of the ordinary virtues like honesty, reliability, and reciprocity that constitute the
basis for social capital.").
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behavioral response.' The brain's ability and tendency to calculate is
an evolved capability, in the same way that the breast's ability to yield
milk after birth is an evolved capability. Neither is more "biological"
than the other in this broad but basic sense. Both are species-typical
aspects of ways in which genes pass themselves from one generation to
the next.
Similarly, for rationality as outcome, the brain of our species tends
to yield rational conclusions (in many, but not all, circumstances) be-
cause ancestral individuals whose heritable brain design tended to
yield irrational conclusions tended to behave in irrational ways. By
definition, such behavior leads to individual disadvantage, and hence
(typically) to reproductive disadvantage. That, over time, leads to
proportionally fewer brains with a predisposition toward irrational
preferences (which, we must remember, vastly outnumber rational
preferences at every moment in time).
This leads me to conclude two things. First, that Fukuyama might
have done better to label the antipode of rational causation emotional
(rather than "biological") causation. Second, that Fukuyama might
fruitfully have framed both the rational and the emotional within the
biological. This second conclusion would afford biology a broader and
more scientifically accurate role, and it would avoid over-cabining
biological influences in the quadrant of Fukuyama's analysis in which
only arational, spontaneous sources of order emerge. It would also
highlight the deep connectedness between emotional and rational be-
havior, which in the end strengthens, in my view, many of Fukuyama's
most interesting points.
In Chapter 8, Fukuyama offers an original, two-axis, four-quadrant
framework for plotting sources of order (p. 152, fig. 8.3).
48. See generally THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
GENERATION OF CULTURE (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby eds., 1992). The alternative in-
cludes context-insensitive decisional rules that are adaptive only on average. For example, a
lemming swims across water. Most lemmings encountering water encounter streams, ponds,
rivers, or lakes - which are swimmable and may afford new foraging opportunities on the
other side. Sometimes the water is an ocean. But the behavioral predisposition is context-
insensitive, leading to the unfortunate demise of many - but importantly not all - lem-
mings. For those who survive the statistically more frequent swims across shorter bodies of
water, a swimming predisposition is still more adaptive, on average, than never swimming,
and therefore such a species-typical predisposition can persist.
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FIGURE 8.3: SOURCES OF ORDER
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Arational
One axis spans from rational to arational sources of order. The bi-
secting axis spans from hierarchically generated sources of order to
spontaneously generated sources of order. There are a variety of self-
evident advantages to this framework. One of the disadvantages is
that it sometimes obscures quite important relationships between dif-
ferent quadrants. For example, it can be interpreted to suggest that
rational, hierarchically generated sources of order, including written
constitutions, "formal law," and other consciously-constructed, top-
down impositions of order are not significantly biologically influenced.
Fukuyama locates incest taboos within the arational, spontaneously
generated, "biologically grounded" norms. At the same time, it is
clear that the opposite quadrant contains formal laws written to pro-
scribe incest. Are these not also biologically influenced, as a function
of the well-documented maladaptiveness of breeding between close
relatives, and the adaptive moral repugnance that typically prevents
it?49 The content of a norm in the hierarchical rational quadrant can
be strongly influenced by the content of a biobehavioral predisposition
evolved as a function of natural selection.5a
49. For discussion of the evolution of incest aversion, see ROBIN FOX, THE RED LAMP
OF INCEST (rev. ed. 1983); Debra Lieberman & Donald Symons, Sibling Incest Avoidance:
From Westermarck to Wolf, 73 Q. REv. OF BIO. 463 (1999).
50. The Uniform Commercial Code, which presumably occupies a position in the
"hierarchical/rational" quadrant of Fukuyama's framework, states that "[e]very contract or
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978). The force of the requirement is underscored by the fact that, in con-
trast to most other provisions of the Code, it cannot be waived by either party or otherwise
contracted around. Although it requires some speculation, it seems probable that such a
provision reflects one end result of natural selection's operation on predispositions con-
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Fukuyama is clearly too sophisticated to believe that the quadrants
are not intimately connected. Yet an emphasis on the inevitability
of their interrelationship is neither highlighted nor explored.
Fukuyama's structure causes readers to stop just short of making one
of the most important points about formal law: many of its patterns
reflect biologically influenced behavioral, moral, and emotional pre-
dispositions. Similarly, the two other quadrants of Fukuyama's
framework, involving arational hierarchically generated sources of or-
der, such as religions, and rational spontaneously generated sources of
order, such as the common law, are imbued with biological influences
on human morality and thus on behavioral predispositions. (Anyone
who believes that religious proscriptions of sexual behavior or the
common law's accommodation of crimes of passion do not reflect
natural selection's operation on human emotions and tastes needs to
think a bit longer.)
Framing rationality and emotionality as close cousins, as I sug-
gested above, rather than as wholly different sources of behavior, re-
quires taking two giant steps back. From this vantage, one can see the
rational and emotional capabilities of the brain as merely varied mani-
festations of a single aspect of brain function. This aspect has evolved
to solve one problem in a variety of different ways. The problem is:
how to increase the proportion of copies of one's genes that appear in
the next generation. That overarching problem is subdivisible,
loosely, into a variety of different kinds of challenges. Some chal-
lenges require nutritional provisioning. Others require identifying and
attracting a suitable sexual partner. Some require the ability to iden-
tify and avoid life-threatening injuries. Others require the sort of in-
group maneuvering for advantage that we label political.
The remarkable thing about the human brain is that it has evolved
to solve these different challenges by associating some kinds of envi-
ronmental stimuli with some kinds of motivational mechanisms (e.g.,
the more visceral emotional pathways), and other kinds of stimuli with
other kinds of motivational mechanisms (e.g., the more consciously
analytical pathways). For example, there are some circumstances
posing sufficiently grave threats, with historically effective options so
limited, that conscious analysis can be dispensed with entirely. Under
these circumstances, an appropriate physiological response can be di-
rected, immediately following perception, by parts of the brain spe-
cerning cooperative interactions, which operation tended to yield sharp moralistic reactions
to "bad faith" (i.e., cheating) acts by defectors from cooperative undertakings. The evolved
emotion toward cheaters likely led to a social norm, which led in turn to customary trade
practices (lex mercatoria), some of which were imported to the common law, and later
codified. Thus, the existence and content of the norm in the hierarchical/rational quadrant
may derive from sources of social order in the spontaneous/arational quadrant, via the
spontaneous/rational quadrant.
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cializing in non-deliberative decisionmaking. That is, the behavior of
the body is removed from rational control.
For instance, in moments of grave physical danger, the brain does
not route the question of appropriate response to the rational calcula-
tor. Instead, it automatically increases heart rate and respiration. It
ensures that adrenaline is secreted by adrenal glands, which natural
selection has favored for performing precisely this function. And it
temporarily redirects energy away from digestive, reproductive, and
other postponable operations, making more energy available for
physical maneuvering, such as flight. In addition, it yanks the con-
scious brain into directing its full and focused attention on a threat
perceived elsewhere in the brain and not yet routed through the ra-
tional calculator. What we call fear is the aggregated physiological re-
sponses the brain directs as a result of evolutionary processes making
this way of generating behavior more likely to result in adaptive re-
sponse to environmental challenges than many other ways of gener-
ating behavior.
A more pointed (if somewhat graphic) example: men do not say
Hmmm. I observe that my wife is having intercourse with another man.
This is a breach of contract. It may yield an offspring, not mine, that by
law I must care for and pay for as if it were. That is likely to be more
costly, over time, than would be my effort to stop it. Hence, I should in-
tervene. "Excuse me...."
The raw absurdity of processing this sort of information through a ra-
tional calculator is not lost on natural selection, which routes the in-
formation in an entirely different way. That is, it is not purely because
we have learned to be jealous that we are jealous. What we call jeal-
ousy is a state of the nervous system that we can identify only because
it increases the probability of behaviors that we take to be consistent
with sexual or emotional proprietariness. 1 The adaptive value of
those behaviors, in ancestral environments, served to preserve the
propensity to respond to infidelity with the information-processing
predisposition that increases the probability of those behaviors.
The main point, though, is that emotional and rational approaches,
as well as every combination of emotional and rational approaches in
between, are all meaningfully biological. They reflect the effects of
natural selection on the brain's ability to generate the appropriate be-
haviors for the appropriate circumstances. Natural selection gives to
the rational calculator what tends to belong there. That does not,
51. On the evolution of jealousy, see DAvID M. Buss, THE DANGEROUS PASSION:
WHY JEALOUSY IS AS NECESSARY AS LOVE AND SEX (2000) and DAvID M. Buss, THE
EvoLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN MATING (1994).
52. For an interesting discussion of how emotions also function, adaptively, as credible
pre-commitment devices, see ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRA-
TEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988).
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however, render the workings or product of the rational calculator any
less meaningfully biological than emotions. And seeing the deep con-
nectedness between the two may help us to avoid the same sort of
over-division that our balkanized disciplines reflect.
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
What are the key legal implications of this line of reasoning? At
the most general level, a biologically-informed approach to law - an
evolutionary analysis in law - can help to refine behavioral models,
generate new legal strategies, improve cost-benefit analyses, and point
directions for future research. 3 In the specific contexts of morals and
norms, there are several specific implications.
A principal utility of evolutionary analysis in law can be summed
up in two words: universal acid. 4 Evolutionary analysis helps to dis-
solve intellectual untenability. No theory of mind, no theory of be-
havior, no theory of culture, and no theory of rational or irrational be-
havior can long stand if it is inconsistent with the way natural selection
has shaped the information-processing, behavior-biasing patterns of
brain function. It is certainly true, of course, that not everything in
modern ethics can be properly thought to emerge inevitably from
naturalistic sources. Nonetheless, evolutionary analysis prevents us
from telling stories to ourselves about where morality comes from that
are inconsistent with scientific knowledge about how the human brain
came to be the way it is. Just as no theory of flight can be inconsistent,
in the end, with the theory of gravity, no theory of human behavior,
morality, or norms, no matter how seemingly transcendent, can be in-
consistent with the process of evolution.5
With the underbrush of untenable theories thinned, evolutionary
analysis next reveals under-recognized relationships between all the
behavioral subjects of law's interest. It plays connect-the-dots with
morals, norms, emotions, rationalities, irrationalities, tastes for risk,
and the like, making a coherent picture from an otherwise insuffi-
ciently coherent assemblage of data points. Just as the relationship
between the numbers 105, 30, and 2000 cannot be fully appreciated
without reference to multiples of 5, the lowest common denominator,
seemingly disparate human behaviors can be neither fully appreciated
53. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 27, at 1226-41.
54. Dennett introduced the metaphor of evolutionary perspectives as universal acid in
DENNETr, supra note 9, at 61-84.
55. This is not to say that evolutionary theory is categorically beyond scientific chal-
lenge. No scientific theory ever is. It is to say, however, that the evolutionary sciences are
far more empirically and theoretically robust than current alternatives, and that any persua-
sive theory of norm formulation (for example) that is inconsistent with them bears the heavy
burden of replacing them with a more accurate and systematically coherent theory.
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nor reconciled without reference to psychological and generative
commonalities most visible in the light of evolutionary analysis.
In short, evolutionary analysis provides a deeper, more accurate,
more contextualized, and more nuanced framework for understanding
the interplay between various psychological predispositions influenc-
ing behavior relevant to law. Its window on the mind opens a view on
human behavior as the product of a brain that evolutionary processes
have functionally specialized to perceive and process information in
ways that tended to yield adaptive solutions to problems encountered
in ancestral environments of evolutionary adaptation. This, in turn,
yields at least three implications.
The first implication is that some norms of behavior relevant to
law evolve not simply because they are more efficient than others, but
because they are more appealing to the human brain than others - as
a function of their effects in deep ancestral environments. Evolution-
ary analysis reveals the under-credited influence of visceral emotions
with narrowly-tailored evolutionary significance on rational reflection
and moral sentiments, from empathy to moralistic aggression. 6 Mor-
alistic outrage at having been cheated by someone, for example, or at
seeing someone else being cheated, can be seen to be no less a biologi-
cal adaptation than our thumbs. The inquiry into what makes moral
behavior feel good and immoral behavior feel bad (in broad brush) is
analogous in important ways to investigating what makes sugar taste
sweet and cardboard taste bad. (Answer: the former is an evolved,
species-typical perception that biases eating behavior toward sources
rich in energy usable by human physiology.) Once this is recognized,
it is but a short step to resolving many otherwise seemingly puzzling
preferences (for spiteful litigation, for example) or supposed irration-
alities. These are sometimes, undoubtedly, the modern manifestations
of historically adaptive psychological predispositions that are, in
much-changed current environments, maladaptive. That they may
lead us to seemingly irrational behavior in a novel environment does
not make them inherently irrational or inexplicable.57
A second implication is that evolutionary analysis provides an en-
tirely new tool of legal history. Because human brains, as a function of
evolutionary processes, must inevitably share some historically adap-
tive information-processing pathways (emotions, moral fundaments,
norms, and the like) that bias behavior, we would expect to see the
imprints of these on human legal systems, cross-culturally. And, in
56. Richard Posner begins to explore the relevance of this in POSNER, supra note 9 (at
33-35. As an example, Amy Wax argues that an evolutionary perspective on reciprocity
norms is useful in helping us understand public attitudes about welfare programs. See Amy
Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political
Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming summer 2000).
57. See Jones, supra note 39.
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fact, we do, although we rarely acknowledge the connection between
evolutionary processes and legal artifacts. This is not to suggest, of
course, that either the specific substance of law (say, the estate tax
rate) or the specific procedure (of probating a will, for example) are
directly traceable to psychological predispositions toward those pre-
cise legal requirements. It is to suggest that the general sentiments at
the root of many human legal manifestations - and of our concep-
tions of law itself - are non-random.
It is not coin-flipping odds, for example, how the legal systems
tend to provide that the property of an intestate decedent will flow
(i.e., to relatives by marriage and blood, in priority according to de-
grees of consanguinity). Nor is the very notion of property coherent
without reference to evolved psychological predispositions to acquire
and use, or to share with some and exclude others. An evolutionary
analysis - attending to ancestral effects of variations in normative re-
actions - helps explain why, for example, within all known human
cultures, rape is proscribed to a degree disproportionate to other
forms of physical harm that do not implicate reproductive capacities.58
Just as history can provide important context for understanding geo-
political boundaries, and the future behavior of states, evolutionary
analysis can provide important context for understanding the legal
landscape, and the ways in which it may develop in the future. We will
miss something important if we fail to see the connection between
biologically influenced norms and the existence of, content of, and
support for legal systems.
A third implication concerns efforts to predict variations in the ef-
fectiveness of different efforts to move human behavior with the tools
of law. At the moment, we have neither a comprehensive nor a par-
ticularly accurate theory to explain why and predict when people will
conform to certain legal prescriptions more than to others. Econom-
ics, certainly, helps us understand that, in many cases, people will be-
have as if they are cost-benefit maximizers of personal utility. But
economics, alone, provides neither a basis for understanding why per-
sonal utility has the content it does (that is, it has no predictive theory
of what people's tastes will be), nor a basis for predicting the strong
emotional content to much human behavior relevant to law. Neither
psychology nor sociology, unsupplemented by behavioral biology, can
suffice to remedy this shortcoming. Evolutionary analysis can help.
For example, it seems to me that a principle derivable from biol-
ogy, which might usefully be termed The Law of Law's Leverage, can
provide tangible purchase for efforts to explain and predict those as-
58. See Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Preven-
tion, supra note 27; Owen D. Jones, Law, Biology, and Rape: Reflections on Transitions, 11
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 151 (2000).
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pects of human behavior that will be most sensitive and least sensitive
to changes in legal rules. It consists of two symmetrical propositions. 9
Proposition One: The cost of using law to reduce the inci-
dence of any behavior will correlate positively with the
extent to which that behavior was adaptive for its bear-
ers, on average, in the relevant environment of evolu-
tionary adaptation.
Proposition Two: The cost of using law to increase the inci-
dence of any behavior will correlate negatively with the
extent to which that behavior was adaptive for its bear-
ers, on average, in the relevant environment of evolu-
tionary adaptation.
This Law of Law's Leverage predicts, for example, that it will gen-
erally be less costly to shift a behavior in ways that tended to increase
reproductive success in ancestral environments than it will be to shift
behavior in ways that tended to decrease reproductive success in an-
cestral environments. The malleability of a behavior in reaction to
changes in law - and therefore, to a great extent, the commensurate
cost of trying to change the behavior - will tend to vary as a function
of the extent to which the behavior was historically adaptive. Put an-
other way, the slope of the demand curve for historically adaptive be-
havior that is now deemed to be socially (in some cases even individu-
ally) undesirable will be far steeper (reflecting less sensitivity to price)
than the corresponding slope for behavior that was comparatively less
adaptive in ancestral environments. Importantly, this rule will tend to
hold, even when the costs that an individual actually and foreseeably
incurs in behaving in a historically adaptive way exceed the presently
foreseeable benefits of such behavior.6°
CONCLUSION
Like the man who searches for lost keys only under the lamppost,
because the light is better there, modem disciplines have tended to fo-
cus their efforts to understand human behavior on uniquely human
cultural processes - because they are readily observable. Law has
followed suit. But while the uniqueness of our species is obvious, it is
neither physically nor behaviorally absolute. Relentlessly abrasive,
59. I suppose I could combine these into one rule. But clarity recommended bifurca-
tion, at least for the time being.
60. This idea is explored at greater length in Jones, Law, Behavioral Economics, and
Evolution, supra note 39. Legal contexts in which the Law of Law's Leverage will be par-
ticularly relevant will be those aspects of, for example, constitutional law, criminal law, fam-
ily law, torts, property, and contracts that involve such things as: mating, fairness, homicide,
child-rearing, status-seeking, property and territory, resource accumulation, sexuality (in-
cluding infidelity and jealousy), speech, privacy, empathy, and crimes of passion.
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systematic, and (emphatically) knowable evolutionary processes have
wrought in us, as in all other animals, a behavioral repertoire of pre-
dispositions. That natural selection has afforded our brain unparal-
leled self-consciousness and rational ability should not obscure the un-
avoidable conclusion that our fundamental emotions, moralities,
norms, and predilections - many of which underlie behavior of criti-
cal importance to law - often reflect adaptations to deep ancestral
environments and conditions.
Against this background, The Great Disruption provides something
far more significant than simply arguing for the importance of social
capital to a thriving economy, and the importance of reconstituting so-
cial order as we move from an industrial to information age society.
(Though those, themselves, are observations worth careful study.) By
exploring how predispositions toward social order can evolve, The
Great Disruption provides a valuable example of how integrating
evolutionary perspectives on human brain and behavior can further
the analysis of important social and political problems. Because so
much of that integration focuses on the evolution of human moral sen-
timents, and because an understanding of morality is central to compe-
tent legal thinking, The Great Disruption therefore offers law some
important insights.
For example, we should be asking not whether our moral senti-
ments could have been influenced by evolutionary history, but how it
could be otherwise. Morality cannot simply be some arbitrary cultural
artifact that happened to gain a foothold because some tabula-rasa
human mind, in some socio-cultural milieu, invented it. Nor are our
morals and norms the glorious and deduced end product of objectively
indisputable ratiocinations. For whatever else they may be, morals
and norms are fundamentally subsets of human behavioral predisposi-
tions, which are in turn a product of human information-processing
patterns, which are in turn a function of human brain structure, which
is in turn a product of evolutionary processes. This has a variety of
implications for the way we think, not only about the relationship be-
tween law and morality, but also about the relationship between law
and behavior.
Viewed in this light it is clear that morals and norms can remain
divorced from biology through only the most artificial and disciplinar-
ily jealous, xenophobic, and acontextual machinations. While it would
be absurd to imagine that biology could alone provide a complete ex-
planation for human moral behavior, it is no less equally absurd to
imagine that moral behavior can be understood, in any deep way,
without knowledge of the pathways and principles by which the
information-processing, behavior-biasing patterns of the human brain
came, through knowable evolutionary processes, to be as they are. An
extreme view? Hardly. Science knows of no way by which it could be
otherwise. Extremity is defined by the contrary assumption: that the
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brain has somehow evolved beyond the reach of the evolutionary pro-
cesses that built it. It is therefore mistaken and misleading, maybe
more, to champion any theory of human norm or morality formation
independent of the effects of evolution on the human brain.
Francis Fukuyama clearly sees all this. He raises some interesting
questions about the implications, and offers some answers. And while
I don't find all of them persuasive, I am persuaded that he is on the
right track, and that legal thinkers should pay attention to the rich op-
portunities evolutionary analysis holds for their own discipline.
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THE UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR OF
CRIMINAL LAW
Stuart P. Green*
BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW. By George P. Fletcher. New
York: Oxford University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 223. Cloth, $45; paper,
$18.95.
There is something about the criminal law that invites comparative
analysis. The interests it protects are so basic, and its concerns so fun-
damental, that it is natural to ask whether there are aspects of criminal
law that are somehow universal. We want to know whether familiar
concepts such as murder and manslaughter, intent and negligence, and
insanity and mistake, are characteristic of other systems of criminal
law as well, and, if so, what role they play there.
In the last generation, no criminal law scholar has made better use
of comparative law techniques than George Fletcher, the Cardozo
Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia Law School. And, not coinci-
dentally, no scholar has done more to define and probe the fundamen-
tal principles of our own system of criminal justice. Now, twenty years
after the publication of his classic Rethinking Criminal Law,1 Fletcher
offers Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, a concise, fair-minded, and
remarkably clear synthesis of virtually all of the major debates in con-
temporary criminal law theory.
Basic Concepts should be of interest to at least three groups of
readers. The first group comprises students in advanced criminal law
classes, who will benefit from Fletcher's gift for finding concrete lan-
guage to explain abstract concepts. The second group consists of
teachers and scholars of substantive criminal law, who will want to see
how Fletcher has clarified and augmented many of the arguments first
made in Rethinking. The third group is potentially much broader.
The most novel and provocative feature of Basic Concepts is its claim
to offer a "deep structure" or "universal grammar" of criminal law,
one that "transcends the enacted law of particular states and coun-
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. B.A. 1983, Tufts University;
J.D. 1988, Yale Law School. - Ed. I am grateful to Hugo Bedau, Jay Bybee, Nora
Demleitner, Markus Dubber, Michael Hegarty, and Jim Whitman for their helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft. I am also pleased to acknowledge the financial support of the
Louisiana Bar Foundation (whose views are not necessarily reflected herein).
1. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978) [hereinafter
RETHINKING].
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tries" (p. 23) and "facilitate[s an] appreciation of the unity of the
world's legal systems" (p. 5). This aspect of the book will be of inter-
est to comparativists and theorists in various areas of the law, who
share with Fletcher an interest in the possibility of finding timeless and
universal principles that underlie their respective disciplines.2
The focus of this Review is on the claim of universality and the in-
novative theoretical framework on which that claim rests. Part I
briefly describes the overall design of Fletcher's project, cataloguing
its principal virtues and defects. Part II then explores the concepts of
deep structure, universal grammar, and other kinds of human univer-
sals as they are used in other disciplines, including linguistics and an-
thropology. Finally, Part III seeks to test the validity of Fletcher's
theory by applying it to a collection of seemingly anomalous criminal
law practices and concepts from China, Japan, Iceland, Melanesia, and
elsewhere. Through this process, I hope to demonstrate both the po-
tential and the limitations of Fletcher's theory.
I. BASIC CONCEPTS - DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
For legal theorists, the goal of Basic Concepts is an enormously at-
tractive one: to "take a step back from the details and the linguistic
variations of the criminal codes" (p. 4), to apply "philosophical and
conceptual analysis" (p. 23), and thereby find "an underlying unity," a
"deep structure" or "universal grammar" (p. 5), a "philosophical di-
mension" (p. vii) common to "diverse systems of criminal justice" (p.
4). How is this goal to be pursued? Fletcher's approach is simple and
elegant. Each of the twelve chapters of Basic Concepts deals with one
of twelve "dichotomies" or "distinctions" that are said to "shape and
guide the controversies that inevitably break out in every system of
criminal justice" (p. 4).' These dichotomies, he says, form a common
2. As Fletcher himself has recently written, "[t]he search for structural features of the
law, the elaboration of distinctions common to all legal cultures, the clarification of the basic
units of legal analysis - all of these are intellectual pursuits that unite scholars from diverse
traditions in a common pursuit." George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Dis-
cipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 693-94 (1998).
3. The twelve dichotomies are as follows:
(1) What is the difference between substantive and procedural criminal law?
(2) How do we mark the boundaries between criminal punishment and other coercive sanc-
tions, such as deportation, that are burdensome but not punitive?
(3) What is the difference between treating a suspect as a subject and treating him as an ob-
ject, both in terms of the criminal act and the trial?
(4) What is the difference between causing harm and harm simply occurring as a natural
event?
(5) What is the difference between determining whether a crime has occurred (wrongdoing)
and attributing that wrongdoing to a particular offender?
(6) What is the distinction between offenses and defenses?
(7) How should we distinguish between intentional and negligent crimes?
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"deep structure" of criminal law. The issues raised by these dichoto-
mies are resolved in different ways by different systems, thereby cre-
ating variations in "surface structure," or positive law.
As a means for structuring his analysis, the dichotomy approach
works superbly. By allowing the reader to focus directly on major
points of controversy, the book offers considerable advantages over
the more traditional "grand theory" approach to criminal law used in
recent years by scholars such as Andrew Ashworth,4 Hyman Gross,5
Douglas Husak,6 Nicola Lacey and Celia Wells,7 Michael Moore,' Paul
Robinson,9 and, indeed, by Fletcher himself.'0
But the dichotomy approach has its drawbacks as well. First, it
tends to impose a theoretical straitjacket, forcing Fletcher to contrive
distinctions that do little to illuminate his subject. The "punishment
versus treatment" dichotomy, for example, turns out to be little more
than a vehicle for Fletcher's discussion of punishment, with the ques-
tion of "treatment" quickly pushed to the periphery. The same can be
said of his discussion concerning the "justice versus legality" dichot-
omy, in which Fletcher's focus is almost wholly on the meaning of le-
gality.
Second, there is, at times, a certain vagueness about the difference
between surface and deep structure. Surface structure is supposed to
be found in "statutory rules and case law decisions," whereas deep
structure is said to be found in the "debates that recur in fact in every
legal culture" (p. 4). But it is obvious that many of the questions
Fletcher identifies as indicative of deep structure (e.g., "how should
(8) Why should there be defenses both of self-defense and necessity, and what is the distinc-
tion between them?
(9) Why are some mistakes relevant to criminal liability and others irrelevant?
(10) How should we distinguish between completed offenses and attempts and other inchoate
crimes?
(11) What is the difference between someone who is a perpetrator of an offense and some-
one who is a mere accessory to the offense?
(12) How do we distinguish between legality and justice in the criminal process?
4. ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (3d ed. 1999).
5. HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1979).
6. DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW (1987).
7. NICOLA LACEY & CELIA WELLS, RECONSTRUCTING CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1998).
8. MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1997).
9. PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCrURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW (1997).
10. RETHINKING, supra note 1. For further reflections on various approaches to crimi-
nal law theorizing, see MOORE, supra note 8, at 3-80 (discussing the kinds of questions a
theory of criminal law ought to consider); Nicola Lacey, Contingency, Coherence, and Con-
ceptualism: Reflections on the Encounter Between "Critique" and "the Philosophy of the
Criminal Law," in PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 9, 48 (Antony Duff ed., 1998)
(distinguishing between "philosophical" and "critical," or doctrinal, theories of criminal
law).
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we distinguish between completed offenses and attempts and other in-
choate crimes?" and "what is the difference between someone who is
a perpetrator of an offense and someone who is a mere accessory to
the offense?") are precisely the sort of questions that statutes and case
law seek to resolve. What Fletcher presumably means - although he
is never particularly clear on this point - is that deep structure con-
sists not of the rules for determining, say, whether a defendant is a
perpetrator or an accomplice, but simply of the fact that there are such
distinctions in the criminal law, and that these distinctions can be ob-
served widely, even universally.
Third, the dichotomy format means that a handful of important is-
sues either turn up in unexpected places (e.g., the discussion of both
insanity and criminal omissions is found, curiously, in a chapter enti-
tled "Subject versus Object"), or are left out entirely. Two omissions
are particularly worth mentioning. One is Fletcher's failure to deal
with the question of the extent to which criminal law is necessarily a
matter of public rather than private law." Another, even more impor-
tant, omission is the almost complete lack of attention to the subject of
specific offenses (even in a chapter entitled "Offenses versus De-
fenses"). As we will see below, if anything is universal in criminal law,
it is almost certainly the prohibition of murder, rape, and other forms
of violence. 2 Yet Fletcher offers few insights as to why some acts are
widely (even universally) criminalized, while others are not. 3 Instead,
like most contemporary criminal law theorists, he is preoccupied with
the criminal law's general part. 4
11. For example, Basic Concepts gives curiously little attention to the important ques-
tion of standing - who is the proper party to bring a criminal case, and what that might tell
us about the extent to which the criminal law reflects public, as opposed to private, interests.
Fletcher mentions the issue only in passing, stating that "[i]n the United States and in most
parts of the common law world today, the public prosecutor claims exclusive authority to
seek punishment for crimes committed against private individuals." P. 36. But he has al-
most nothing to say about the extent to which the public aspect of criminal prosecutions
might itself be part of the criminal law's deep structure.
12. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. Another good candidate for universality is
the classification of offenses according to the nature and degree of harmfulness, which I dis-
cuss in Stuart P. Green, Deceit and the Classification of Offenses: Federal Rule of Evidence
609(a) (2) and the Origins of Crimen Falsi, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming
2000).
13. It is worth noting that simply because some practice is universal does not necessarily
mean that it is part of a "universal grammar." As used by Fletcher, universal grammar refers
to a set of generalizable abstract principles that can be derived from the observation of wide-
spread or universal practices. Thus, the fact that criminal offenses such as murder and rape
are universally prohibited might lead one to derive some more general principle regarding
the criminalization of certain kinds of harmful and intentional acts. For more on the various
meanings of "universal," see infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
14. I have discussed criminal law scholarship's preoccupation with the general part
elsewhere. See Stuart P. Green, Prototype Theory and the Classification of Offenses in a Re-
vised Model Penal Code: A General Approach to the Special Part, 4 BuFF. GRIM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2000). For a recent example, see LEO KATZ ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF
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Fourth, although the various horns of Fletcher's dichotomies fre-
quently do delineate the range of choices that legal systems make with
respect to specific issues in criminal law, there is little explanation of
how and why particular systems make the choices they do within such
ranges. To put it another way, while the dichotomy approach does a
good job of explaining what is similar across systems, it is much less
concerned with the way in which various universals express themselves
differently in different environments.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Fletcher fails to offer any
meta-theory that would explain the deeper meaning of his dichoto-
mies. For example, there is no explanation as to why the criminal law
reflects these dichotomies and not others, whether the dichotomy
structure is also characteristic of other areas of the law, and what the
ultimate source of such dichotomies might be." In the end, what
Fletcher provides is an exceptionally well-informed and insightful
collection of deep-seated and widely observed distinctions in criminal
law. What remains unclear are his views on the larger significance of
that collection.
II. THE SEARCH FOR "DEEP STRUCTURE," "UNIVERSAL
GRAMMAR," AND "HUMAN UNIVERSALS"
Early in Basic Concepts, Fletcher tells us that the "deep structure"
or "universal grammar" he is pursuing is akin to Noam Chomsky's fa-
mous work in linguistics. 6 To assess Fletcher's project, then, it will be
helpful to know both what these terms mean for Chomsky, and what
they might mean to Fletcher. In addition, we will want to know some-
thing about other kinds of "human universals" that might be relevant
to the study of criminal law.
A. What Linguists Mean by "Deep Structure" and
"Universal Grammar"
As he himself has acknowledged elsewhere, Fletcher is hardly the
first legal scholar to assert that he is pursuing a Chomsky-like proj-
CRIMINAL LAW 4 (1999) (stating that book on foundations of criminal law will consider only
the general part).
15. For a discussion of the possible shape of such a meta-theory, see infra note 32.
16. P. 5 ("As Noam Chomsky developed a universal grammar underlying all the par-
ticular languages of the world, here, in these twelve distinctions lies the grammar of criminal
law."). Chomsky's most influential account of transformational grammar can be found in
NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX (1965); NOAM CHOMSKY,
SYNTACrIC STRUCrURES (1957). For a useful introduction to Chomsky's work, see JOHN
LYONS, NOAM CHOMSKY (1970).
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ect.17 Yet such scholars have offered almost no discussion of either
what the Chomskyian project actually consists of, or the extent to
which Chomsky's work provides them with a plausible theoretical
model.
At the outset, it should be clear that linguists use the terms "deep
structure" and "universal grammar" to refer to quite different con-
cepts. Linguists attempt to offer an analysis of language that explains
how and why certain word strings can be recognized as well-formed
sentences by native speakers. Although there is an infinite number of
sentences that can be formed in any language, it is possible to identify
a finite collection of "phrase structure rules" and "lexical insertion
rules" that build "base component" trees, the underlying structures of
well-formed sentences."i These "deep structures," or "d-structures,"
are then converted into one or more actual sentences (known as "sur-
face structures" or "s-structures") by the application of linguistic de-
vices known as "transformations." The whole system, consisting of
base components plus transformations, is known as "generative" or
"transformational grammar."19
"Universal grammar," as its name suggests, refers to something
quite different from the language-specific deep structures of genera-
tive grammar.' The basic idea of universal grammar is that there are
certain "principles," or "super-rules," that are genetically "wired" into
our brains.21 These innate principles become instantiated as the de-
terminate grammar of a particular language when the parameters of
universal grammar are set, and thereby explain how it is that children
are able, so easily and so quickly, to learn something as complex as
their native language. The term "universal grammar" is therefore
used to refer both to "the basic design underlying the grammars of all
17. See George P. Fletcher, What Law is Like, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 1599,1604 n.22 (1997)
(citing numerous law review articles that have used the term "deep structure").
18. See CHOMsKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTuRES, supra note 16.
19. Id. It should be noted, however, that in his later work Chomsky no longer relies on
the notion of deep structures. See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, THE MINIMALIST PROGRAM
(1995).
20. Chomsky himself has noted the frequent confusion between deep structure and uni-
versal grammar. See NoAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND RESPONSIBILITY 171-72 (1977) ("I
have often read that what I am proposing is that deep structures do not vary from one lan-
guage to another, that all languages have the same deep structure: people have apparently
been misled by the word deep and confuse it with invariant. Once again, the only thing I
claim to be 'invariant' is universal grammar."). For an example of such confusion, see D.L.
Perrott, Has Law a Deep Structure? - The Origin of Fundamental Duties, in
FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES 1 (D. Lasok et al. eds., 1980).
21. Chomsky's claims regarding universal grammar can be found, among other places, in
Noam Chomsky, Linguistics and Cognitive Science: Problems and Mysteries, in LANGUAGE
IN FOCUS: FOUNDATIONS, METHODS AND SYSTEMS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF YEHOSHUA
BAR-HILLEL (A. Kasher ed., 1991); CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAx, su-
pra note 16, at 25.
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human languages" and to "the circuitry in children's brains that allows
them to learn the grammar of their parents' language. "'2
With respect to universal grammar, a considerable amount of em-
pirical evidence has tended to substantiate Chomsky's claims. Starting
in the early 1960s, for example, a team of scholars led by Joseph
Greenberg examined a sample of thirty languages from five conti-
nents, including Basque, Berber, Burmese, Finnish, Hebrew, Hindi,
Italian, Japanese, Malay, Maori, Massai, Mayan, Nubian, Quechua,
Serbian, Swahili, and Turkish.' In these early studies, which focused
on word order and morphemes, researchers found no fewer than forty-
five universals. Since then, according to linguist and cognitive scientist
Steven Pinker, "many other surveys have been conducted, involving
scores of languages from every part of the world, and literally hun-
dreds of universal patterns have been documented." 4
B. What Anthropologists Mean by Human Universals
The idea that there is an empirically verifiable, innate, or at least
universal, quality to something as apparently culture-specific as lan-
guage is, of course, an enormously intriguing one. If it is possible to
prove that human language, in all of its tremendous variety, has an
underlying and unchanging unity, then it may well be possible to find
proof of underlying universals in other realms of human behavior as
well - including, perhaps, morality, manners, social hierarchy, family
dynamics, humor, music, art, or even law. Inspired in part by the work
of Chomsky and Greenberg, a number of ethnographers in recent
years have turned from the anthropologist's traditional focus on cul-
tural differences to a renewed interest in finding human commonalities
(or universals, as they tend to be called) - behavioral patterns and
22. CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX, supra note 16, at 27-30; STEVEN
PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INsTINCT 483 (1994).
23. See UNrVERSALS OF LANGUAGE (J.H. Greenberg ed., 1963). Greenberg and his
colleagues were not explicitly attempting to confirm Chomsky's hypotheses, but many of
their findings have nevertheless had that effect. See PINKER, supra note 22, at 233.
24. PINKER, supra note 22, at 233. According to Pinker:
Some [universal patterns] hold absolutely. For example, no language forms questions by re-
versing the order of words within a sentence, like Built Jack that house the this is? Some are
statistical: subjects normally precede objects in almost all languages, and verbs and their
objects tend to be adjacent.... The largest number of universals involve implications: if a
language has X, it will also have Y... Universal implications are found in all aspects of lan-
guage... [including meaning]: if a language has a word for "purple," it will have a word for
"red"; if a language has a word for "leg," it will have a word for "arm."
Id. at 233-34. "What is most striking of all," according to Pinker, "is that we can look at a
randomly picked language and find things that can sensibly be called subjects, objects, and
verbs." Id. at 236. What has been demonstrated, he says, is "that the same symbol-
manipulating machinery, without exception, underlies the world's languages." Id. at 237.
2110 [Vol. 98:2104
HeinOnline  -- 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2110 1999-2000
Universal Grammar of Criminal Law
practices that are the same regardless of cultural and ethnic bounda-
ries?2
Anthropologists use the term universal in a variety of different
contexts. Some universals exist at the level of the individual, or at
least in every individual of a certain sex or age range; examples are
certain emotions and facial expressions. 6 A second kind of universal
exists at the level of society (generally defined as the manner in which
individuals or groups relate to and among each other); an example is
the sexual division of labor.' A third kind of universal exists at the
level of culture (a term which refers to conventional patterns of
thought, activity, and artifact that are passed from generation to gen-
eration); examples of this kind of universal are tools and kinship ter-
minologies.' In addition, distinctions are often drawn between "sub-
stantive" and "formal" universals29; and "conditional" and
"unconditional" universals. 30 Finally, we might distinguish between
those practices or ideas that are universal merely in the sense that they
occur at some time in every culture, and those practices or ideas that
occur (comprehensively) in every relevant case in every culture.
As in the case of linguistic universals, the search for individual, cul-
tural, and societal universals has been quite promising. Evidence of
universals of one kind or another has been found in matters as diverse
as sexual jealousy and Oedipal feelings; adornment of bodies and ar-
25. See, e.g., DONALD E. BROWN, HuMAN UNIVERSALS (1991); ROBIN FOX, THE RED
LAMP OF INCEST (1980). The traditional anthropological approach is exemplified most fa-
mously by the ethnographic works of Margaret Mead. See, e.g., MARGARET MEAD,
COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA (1936). For a critique of Mead's work in Samoa, see DEREK
FREEMAN, MARGARET MEAD AND SAMOA: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL MYTH (1983).
26. See BROWN, supra note 25, at 39.
27. See idL
28. See id. at 40.
29. As Chomsky has characterized the distinction (referring to universals in language):
A theory of substantive universals claims that items of a particular kind in any language
must be drawn from a fixed class of items.... A theory of substantive semantic universals
might hold for example, that certain designative functions must be carried out in a specified
way in each language. Thus it might assert that each language will contain terms that desig-
nate persons or lexical items referring to certain specific kinds of objects, feelings, behavior,
and so on.
It is also possible, however, to search for universal properties of a more abstract sort. Con-
sider a claim that the grammar of every language meets certain specified formal conditions.
The truth of this hypothesis would not in itself imply that any particular rule must appear in
all or even in any two grammars. The property of having a grammar meeting a certain ab-
stract condition might be called a fonnal linguistic universal, if shown to be a general prop-
erty of natural languages.
CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX, supra note 16, at 28-29.
30. An "implicational" or "conditional" universal (in contrast to an "unrestricted" or
"non-conditional" universal) is a trait or complex that appears if and only if certain condi-
tions obtain - for example, "all societies possessing paved highways possess centralized
government." See BROWN, supra note 25, at 45.
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rangement of hair; recognized facial expressions of happiness, sadness,
anger, fear, disgust, and contempt; food taboos and fondness for
sweets; gifts and the exchange of labor, goods, and services; and logical
relations including and, not, same, equivalence, opposites, general ver-
sus particular, and part versus whole.31 In addition, anthropologists
have found a number of universals that are directly relevant to the
criminal law - including concepts like intention, responsibility, rights,
and property; distinctions between voluntary and involuntary behav-
ior; procedures for seeking redress of wrongs; government, in the
sense of binding collective decisions about public affairs; institutions
for punishment; and "legal" prohibitions on rape, murder, and other
forms of violence.32
C. Fletcher and the Search for Universals in Law
If these linguists and anthropologists are right, if human beings
really do share universal norms and practices of these sorts, what im-
plications might there be for our understanding of law in general, and
the criminal law in particular?33 Fletcher never tells us precisely what
he has in mind here, although at least two possibilities can be ruled
out. First, it seems clear that when Fletcher invokes Chomsky, he is
31. See id. Brown's findings are helpfully summarized in PINKER, supra note 22, at 412-
15.
32. See BROWN, supra note 25, at 69, 134-39, 176-78, 182. Assuming that such concepts,
distinctions, procedures, institutions, and prohibitions are in fact universal, the next question
we would need to ask is: How did they get that way? Among the possible kinds of explana-
tions that might be offered are the following:
(1) Diffusionist Explanation: Some cultural practices, such as cooking and the use of fire,
seem to have been invented in some small number of societies and then spread widely
throughout the world in a process known as "diffusion." To develop a diffusionist theory of
criminal law, we would need to compile evidence that various criminal law concepts (such as,
say, accomplice liability or the principle of legality) developed in a similar manner.
(2) Physical Explanation: Some aspects of culture are thought to be a response to certain
physical characteristics in humans. For example, various kinship roles seem to be a response
to the physical requirements of sexual reproduction. Under a physical theory of criminal
law, concepts such as rape and murder might be viewed as a response to conflicting human
tendencies towards, say, violence (on the one hand) and the desire for physical safety (on the
other).
(3) Evolutionary Explanation: Many forms of human behavior are believed to be the prod-
uct of evolved human characteristics - the result of natural selection, the process by which
better adapted organisms outbreed those that are less well adapted. Under an evolutionary
theory, certain aspects of criminal law (again, the prohibitions on rape and murder provide a
good example) would be viewed as analogous forms of adaptation.
For a survey of the literature concerning these and others explanations for human universals,
see id. at 88-117.
33. Other legal scholars have begun dealing with similar issues. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Law
as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263, 1279 (1995) ("The existence
of universal grammar reinforces the discovery of universals in other language-based disci-
plines."); John 0. McGinnis, The Human Constitution and Constitutive Law: A Prolegome-
non, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211 (1997) (suggesting that work in the social sciences
involving evolutionary theories of human nature should begin to inform legal scholarship).
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not referring to the search for some finite set of underlying rules (a
deep structure) from which an infinite number of legal propositions
(the surface structure) can be derived - a process that would be
analogous to the transformations that occur in linguistic theory. Nor
does he suggest that human beings share some genetic predisposition,
some "hard wiring" in our brains that manifests itself in different sur-
face structures, norms, or behaviors that, in turn, give content to the
criminal law.'
Rather, what Fletcher seems to be claiming is simply that there is,
in his words, some "underlying unity among diverse systems of crimi-
nal justice," some "basic design" that is common to all of these various
and disparate systems. To put it another way, what Fletcher seems to
be saying is that, if a society does develop a system of criminal jus-
tice,35 then that system will possess characteristics that are contained in
the continuum marked out by his collection of dichotomies.
III. TESTING FLETCHER'S CLAIM OF UNIVERSALITY
Just as linguistic anthropologists have done fieldwork intended to
confirm the theoretical construct developed by Chomsky, it is natural
to ask whether empirical evidence could be found to support the thesis
developed by Fletcher. But how exactly does one "test" a universal
theory of law?
As noted above, anthropologists have had some success in discov-
ering universals that are relevant to the criminal law .3  Nevertheless,
there is obviously a wide conceptual gap between generalized criminal
law universals of this sort and criminal law universals of the sort pos-
ited by Fletcher. That is, even if there were evidence that every cul-
ture, say, distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary behavior,
or imposes basic legal prohibitions on murder and rape, one might still
34. For an example of such reasoning, see Perrott, supra note 20, at 10.
35. There may, of course, be societies that never actually develop such a system. One
such possible exception is the Ifugao tribe of the Philippines, described in E. Adamson
Hoebel's survey of literature on the world's legal cultures:
By virtue of the nature of Ifugao social organization there can be no criminal acts. All other
legally recognized offenses are of the type known in Anglo-American law as torts: private
(or civil) wrongs or injuries independent of contract. Among the Ifugao the responsibility
for initiating any prosecution rests with the aggrieved; any damages, penal assessments, or
physical punishment inflicted upon the defendant are imposed by the plaintiff and his kins-
men. The lines of procedure are anything but raw self-help, however. Custom requires that
proper procedural protocol be carefully exhausted before resort to direct seizure of the lance
is taken.
E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRiMrIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL
DYNAMICS 113-14 (1967) (footnotes omitted) (citing R.F. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW (1919)).
Unfortunately, as noted supra note 11 and accompanying text, one of the important issues
on which Fletcher has little to say in Basic Concepts is the extent to which a system of public,
as opposed to private, prosecutions is fundamental to the idea of a criminal law.
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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be skeptical about the claim that every criminal law system recognizes
more refined distinctions such as those between self-defense and ne-
cessity, or perpetration and complicity. If we are to find evidence of
those kinds of distinctions, we need to go beyond the findings of the
anthropologists.
There are two ways in which Fletcher's theory might be tested.
One is to take the theory articulated in Basic Concepts and attempt to
apply it, in toto, to various criminal law systems around the world. In-
deed, this seems to be exactly what Fletcher has in mind. He tell us
that there are plans to publish the book in various foreign editions, in
which "a local commentator takes charge of the translation and adds
material on the way the twelve universal distinctions.., find expres-
sion in local positive law."'37
Unfortunately, this process is likely to take years to complete. A
book review calls for something more expedient. Rather than using
Fletcher's approach to examine foreign criminal law systems in their
entirety, I suggest that we use it to look at a collection of specific for-
eign criminal practices and principles. In particular, I propose that we
take a collection of specific criminal law practices and principles that
Fletcher himself does not consider, and which, from the perspective of
contemporary Western practice, may seem anomalous; and then ask
whether and to what extent Fletcher's theory can provide an adequate
account.
A. Six Case Studies
Viewing Fletcher's theory through the lens of the six case studies
presented here should prove useful in several ways. By applying the
theory to the specifics of various legal systems, we will be able to as-
sess its reliability and comprehensiveness, confirm its significance,
question its premises, and suggest possible modifications. In addition,
if the theory is a good one, it should yield valuable insights into the
specific legal rules and principles that are the subject of our case stud-
ies."'
37. P. vii. One can only hope that Fletcher's foreign publishers serve him better than his
prestigious English language publisher, which has released the book with a distracting num-
ber of typographical errors. See e.g., p. 14 ("The evidence on that evidence [sic] is simply
inconclusive."); p. 45 ("it follows from the above syllogism - that there would be something
just [sic] or conceptually untoward about punishing the bystander."); p. 111 ("These are case
[sic] of intentional conduct .... "); p. 114 ("Suppose that absentmindedly you leave the li-
brary without having first having [sic] checked out the book you were reading."); p. 123
("Does Oswald want or desire to injury [sic] either JFK or Connally?"); p. 125 ("If Oswald
acts intentionally regardless of the gun pointed at his head, how he [sic] could possibly es-
cape liability for murder?"); p. 126 ("Oswald suddenly turned on the KGB agent and
grabbed the latter's rifle, causing it [sic] discharge in the direction of the crowd below.").
38. Cf RICHARD S. KAYNE, FRENCH SYNTAX: THE TRANSFORMATIONAL CYCLE xviii
(1975) (stating similar goals for study that uses French syntax as case study in test of
Chomskyian transformational grammar).
2114 [Vol. 98:2104
HeinOnline  -- 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2114 1999-2000
Universal Grammar of Criminal Law
Before I catalogue the cases, though, several comments are in or-
der. First, it should be noted that most, though not all, of the exam-
ples are historical. This departs from Fletcher's own orientation to
contemporary legal systems, but is nevertheless well within the claims
of a universal theory. Indeed, Fletcher has elsewhere referred to his
dichotomies as involving "eternal questions,"3 9 and it seems reason-
able to infer that his goal is to develop a universal theory that can ac-
count for historical, as well as contemporary, practices.
It is also worth noting that the countries from which my examples
come are mostly non-Western. This focus will, I hope, provide a
useful antidote to the Western bias in Fletcher's own scholarship.
William Ewald has described the tendency among theorists to "elevate
the local rules of [their] own time and place into universal truths for all
humanity."'  With his deep knowledge of German and Anglo-
American legal history and jurisprudence, and his respectable
acquaintance with Italian, French, Spanish, Israeli, and Talmudic
criminal law, Fletcher is certainly less guilty of this vice than other
scholars. Yet even such considerable erudition cannot, without more,
justify a claim of universality.
Finally, it should be recognized that the descriptions offered below
have been drawn primarily from secondhand accounts of foreign law.
I have not sought to confirm independently the validity of the inter-
pretations offered. Nor, in general, have I sought to provide a broader
context for the practices discussed. In my attempt to test the flexibility
of Fletcher's theory, I have more or less taken the descriptions at face
value.
Here, then, is a range of criminal law principles and practices that,
from the perspective of contemporary Western legal systems, should
strike the reader as anomalous:
e Much of Western legal history has witnessed cases involving the
criminal prosecution and punishment of animals and inanimate
objects. The Book of Exodus, for example, provides that an ox
that gores a man or woman to death is to be stoned, and its flesh
not eaten. The ancient Greeks regularly held trials involving both
animals and inanimate things (e.g., stones, beams, and pieces of
39. George Fletcher, The Fall and Rise of Criminal Theory, 1 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 275,
285-86 (1998) ("These basic concepts of criminal justice are philosophical and conceptual in
nature. They possess a truth value that cannot be resolved by an act of law-making will. A
legislature can no more resolve a philosophical problem than it can determine a matter of
scientific controversy.... Codes must be understood, therefore, as tentative answers to eter-
nal questions. Scholars must remain committed to probing the depths of those eternal ques-
tions, whatever the local code may say on the matter.").
40. William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (1): What Was It Like To Try A Rat?,
143 U. PA. L. REv. 1889, 1958 (1995). Ewald goes on: "[I]ndeed, as is well known, the great
systems of Natural Law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were largely rearrange-
ments of the rules of Justinian's Digest." Id.
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iron that had caused the death of a person by falling on him).41
Barthelemy Chassen6e, a leading French lawyer and scholar of
the sixteenth century, wrote A Treatise on the Excommunication
of Insects, which discusses the full range of issues that would be
expected to arise during a trial of insects, and offers a theoretical
analysis of the issues raised by the prosecution of animals more
generally, including "a careful distinction between punitive
prosecutions of animals, and prosecutions that are merely in-
tended to deter future harmful conduct."42
" Crime and Custom in Savage Society, Bronislaw Malinowski's
seminal work of legal anthropology, published in 1926, describes
the early twentieth century legal culture of the Trobriand Islands
in Melanesia.43 Although many legal practices in Melanesian so-
ciety seem vague, Malinowski describes a striking incident of
what he regards as a paradigmatic exercise of criminal justice: A
young man was having a sexual relationship with his maternal
cousin, the daughter of his mother's sister - a relationship that
was prohibited by Trobriand law. When the affair was discovered
by a rival lover, the rival insulted the offending man in public, ac-
cusing him of incest. "For this," Malinowski tells us, "there was
only one remedy; only one means of escape remained to the un-
fortunate youth. Next morning he put on festive attire and orna-
mentation, climbed a coco-nut [sic] palm and addressed the
community, speaking from among the palm leaves and bidding
them farewell .... Then he wailed aloud, as is the custom,
jumped from a palm some sixty feet high and was killed on the
spot. 44
" The criminal law of mediaeval Iceland (around the year 800) was
dominated by an elaborate system of rules regarding revenge.
According to one commentator, "an individual was not regarded
as a separate being to the same extent as he is today, but was
looked upon as a link in the long family chain. It was the family
that was responsible for right and wrong, for revenge, and for de-
fending its own reputation. The duty to take revenge for any in-
sult was an unwritten law based on the concept that a man's hon-
41. See Walter Woodburn Hyde, The Prosecution and Punishment of Animals and Life-
less Things in the Middle Ages and Modem Times, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 696,698 (1916); see also
EDWARD P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF
ANIMALS (1906); Paul Schiff Berman, Note, Rats, Pigs, and Statues on Trial: The Creation of
Cultural Narratives in the Prosecution of Animals and Inanimate Objects, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
288 (1994).
42. See Ewald, supra note 40, at 1900-01.
43. BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1932). For
criticism of Malinowski's methodology and findings, see sources cited infra note 61.
44. MAULINOWSKI, supra note 43, at 78.
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our and that of his family had to be maintained intact."'45 "The
starting point for penal law was the mannhelgi, or a free man's le-
gally guaranteed immunity with regard to his person, property,
honour, personal peace, and security. Every violation was con-
sidered an insult to the offended person, or to his family, and the
offender, by committing his unlawful deed, automatically lost his
immunity partly or totally, and became 6heilagr. This meant that
in the event of revenge, nothing could be claimed for him by his
family. The most appropriate response to violation was revenge,
permitted everywhere, at any time, and upon any member of the
opposing family."46
" Under Japanese law of the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries,
local officials known as kendan were given extensive powers to
enforce harsh theft laws. Under these laws, punishment extended
to the thief's wife and children, in addition to the thief himself.
According to one commentator, these laws tended to be enforced
less for the purpose of deterring crime than for the purpose of en-
riching the kendan (and thereby preserving their place in the
chain of power that ran from the emperor to the local samurai).47
" The contemporary criminal justice system in Japan has as its prin-
cipal goal the "reintegration" of the offender into the community.
As Daniel Foote has described, the Japanese criminal justice sys-
tem "place[s] primary emphasis on reformation, which involves
considering family circumstances, employment status, and other
types of support mechanisms available to the offender, and, to a
lesser extent, satisfaction of the victim. Confession also plays a
key role.., as both a means to and reflection of the moral cathar-
sis of the individual deemed essential to true reform .... [The]
approach is consciously benevolent to the extent that it reflects
the view that generosity will generate feelings of gratitude and
indebtedness, thereby encouraging offenders to rehabilitate
themselves."48 Similar patterns of "benevolent" or "paternalistic"
criminal justice have been observed in several Native American
systems described by Karl Llewellyn.49
45. Martina Stein-Wilkeshuis, Punishment in Iceland, A Survey, in RECUELS DE LA
SOcitTA JEAN BODIN POUR L'HISTOIRE COMPARATIVE DES INSTITUTIONS (Vol. LVI) -
LA PEINE 87 (1991).
46. Id. at 89.
47. See Shiro Ishii, Crime and Punishment Japanese Traditions, in RECUEILS DE LA
SOcitTP JEAN BODIN POUR L'HISTOIRE COMPARATIVE DES INSTITUTIONS (Vol. LVIII)
- LA PEINE 411,416 (1991).
48. Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL.
L. REV. 317,360 (1992).
49. KARL N. LLE\VELLYN, The Anthropology of Criminal Guilt, in JURISPRUDENCE,
439-50 (1962). Llewellyn says that, in Cheyenne and New Mexican Pueblo culture, the pur-
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One of the principal objects of penal law during the Chinese
imperial period was to secure the enforcement of fundamental
Chinese morality." "Lack of filial piety" and violation of
mourning laws were both considered particularly serious offenses.
For example, the Ch'ing code (1644-1911) provided that a person
who concealed the death of a parent or husband and did not go
into mourning was to be punished with penal servitude for one
year and sixty blows with the heavy stick. Removal of the formal
mourning garments before the requisite period had elapsed and
indulgence in pleasures such as music or banqueting was to be
punished with ninety blows from the heavy stick. The T'ang code
(618-907) imposed even harsher penalties for such offenses.
Moreover, if a father beat his son to death and then secretly
buried the body, the father was held liable not for the killing but
for the secret burial.51 In addition, a child whose parent
committed suicide could be held liable where the suicide could be
attributed, even in the most.tenuous way, to unfilial conduct 2
B. Applying Basic Concepts to the Test Cases
There is much in these cases to distinguish them from contempo-
rary Western criminal law. In what follows, I focus on certain par-
ticularly intriguing details to illustrate both how Fletcher's theory
works and where its limitations might lie.
1. The Subject/Object Dichotomy and the Criminal Prosecution
of Animals
Can Fletcher's theory account for the historically observed practice
of criminal prosecutions involving animals and inanimate objects? At
one point, Fletcher seems to say no. According to Fletcher, "[a]ll legal
systems concur that punishment is imposed only for human action....
It is considered barbaric to punish animals for causing harm."53 In
fact, however, this is merely a statement about positive law. (Despite
the goal of digging beneath surface structure, Fletcher can hardly
pose of the trial is to "bring the erring brother, now known to be such, to repentance, to
open confession, and to reintegration with the community of which he was and still is re-
garded an integral part." Id. at 448 (emphasis in original).
50. See GEOFFREY MACCoRMAcK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW 52-68
(1996).
51. See id. at 61.
52. See id. at 65.
53. P. 44. Fletcher also deals with the prosecution of animals in Rethinking, in a some-
what different context. See RETHINKING, supra note 1, at 343-49 (using history to illustrate
distinction between "blaming" and "tainting" in law of forfeiture and homicide).
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avoid characterizing and taking various positions on positive law). As
it turns out, Fletcher's dichotomy theory may well be broad enough to
accommodate such prosecutions.
To deal with the question of prosecuting animals, we need to look
to Chapter 3 of Basic Concepts, in which Fletcher discusses his dichot-
omy between treating defendants as "subjects" - as someone who
acts, an end in himself - and treating them as "objects" - someone
or something that is acted upon, a mere means to an end. Although
not posed directly in positive criminal law, Fletcher says, this distinc-
tion underlies many disputes about defining and determining who is
liable for committing an offense (p. 43). Retribution-based theories,
under which a responsible agent is "called to account for his wrong-
doing," are consistent with the Kantian requirement that human be-
ings be treated as subjects, or ends in themselves. A deterrence-based
theory, by contrast, treats a defendant as a mere object, a means to an
end (p. 43).
So how should we approach the criminal prosecution of animals
and inanimate objects under Fletcher's theory? Three hypotheses
suggest themselves. First, one might think that such prosecutions sim-
ply reflect the far end of the subject/object spectrum. Assuming that
the purpose of such prosecutions is, if not to deter, then at least to in-
capacitate, one might argue that prosecuting and punishing animals is
merely the most extreme manifestation of an object-based system of
criminal justice, the clearest case of treating a defendant as a means to
an end. Second, one might use Fletcher's theory as an occasion to
look more deeply into the metaphysics of such prosecutions. Perhaps
animal defendants were being viewed as subjects, as responsible moral
agents, or ends-in-themselves. Or perhaps such trials were intended,
as one scholar has put it, to restore the "moral equilibrium of the
community [that] had been disturbed by the" crime and further the
view "that somebody or something must be punished or else dire mis-
fortune.., would overtake the land."54 Third, one might make the
kind of argument that advocates of natural law have long favored -
namely, that despite their formal trappings, such prosecutions are "not
really" criminal prosecutions after all, that they fall outside the uni-
verse of what Fletcher is attempting to describe.5
It is hard to say for sure which of these three approaches Fletcher
would favor. His statement that "punishment is imposed only for hu-
man action" suggests that he would probably be sympathetic to the
54. Hyde, supra note 41, at 698. Cf Paul Schiff Berman, An Anthropological Approach
to Modern Forfeiture Law: The Symbolic Function of Legal Actions Against Objects, 11
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 4-5 (1999) ("such legal proceedings permitted the community to
heal itself after the breach of a social norm by creating a narrative whereby a symbolic trans-
gressor of the established order was deemed to be 'guilty' of a 'crime' and cast beyond the
boundaries of the society").
55. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW 96-106 (rev. ed. 1969).
May 2000) 2119
HeinOnline  -- 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2119 1999-2000
Michigan Law Review
natural law, "not really" criminal law argument - one that, unfortu-
nately, suffers from circularity. 6
Whatever his favored response, though, it seems to me that
Fletcher's theory does provide the analytical tools to address the ques-
tion posed. Whether a particular system allows for the criminal prose-
cution of animals and inanimate objects is ultimately a question about
whether such defendants are regarded as subjects or objects. To find
the answers, we would obviously have to examine the historical evi-
dence. The value of Fletcher's theory lies in the questions it leads us
to ask.
2. The Perpetration/Complicity Dichotomy and Mediaeval Icelandic
and Japanese Law
Chapter 11 of Basic Concepts offers a distinction between perpe-
tration and complicity. A perpetrator is the person who commits the
actual actus reus of the crime. An accomplice is the one who counsels,
assists, advises, or solicits (p. 188). The distinction is key to deter-
mining both how responsibility should be allocated among different
participants in a common scheme, and the extent to which groups qua
groups can be held liable for a crime. Here, again, Fletcher has some
interesting observations on how this distinction is played out in posi-
tive law. Some ancient legal systems, he says, seem not to have recog-
nized accomplice liability at all. American and French law tend to
support the view that perpetrators and accomplices should be treated
equivalently. German and Russian law incline to the view that ac-
complices should be punished less severely (pp. 188-89).
The question here is whether Fletcher's dichotomy can help ex-
plain the practice in mediaeval Icelandic and Japanese law of applying
criminal sanctions not just to the person who actually committed the
offense but also to members of the perpetrator's family. Put another
way, does it make sense to speak of the perpetrator's family members
as "accomplices"? Or is some other dynamic at work?
At first glance, it seems obvious that family members per se cannot
meet the requirement of complicity. Neither counseling, assisting, ad-
vising, nor soliciting is a prerequisite to liability. Their only crime, as
it were, is that they happen to be related - a notion that strikes our
modern, Western sensibilities as deeply unjust. On the other hand,
under modern statutes, a parent can be held criminally liable for "im-
properly supervising," or "contributing to the delinquency of," a mi-
nor.57 Perhaps, one might think, the theory that underlies Icelandic
56. For criticism of the natural law argument, see, for example, RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 102 (1986).
57. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14: 92,92.2 (West 1990).
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and Japanese familial liability is similar to the theory that presumably
underlies such statutes - that family members have certain duties or
responsibilities to each other and that failing to prevent such criminal
activity is a culpable breach of that duty. Perhaps. But it seems obvi-
ous that there is a significant moral difference between imposing li-
ability on a parent for the acts of a child and imposing liability on a
child for the acts of a parent.
One is left with the impression that familial liability in mediaeval
Iceland and Japan lay somewhere outside the perpetration/complicity
dichotomy. One would, of course, want to know more about the cir-
cumstances under which mediaeval Icelandic and Japanese law im-
posed criminal penalties on otherwise non-complicitous family mem-
bers. At a minimum, though, such liability is likely to put a strain on
Fletcher's conceptual framework.
3. The Punishment/Treatment Dichotomy, Malinowski's Trobriand
Suicide, and the "Benevolent Paternalism" of Contemporary
Japanese Criminal Justice
In Chapter 2 of Basic Concepts, Fletcher seeks to formulate a uni-
versally applicable definition of "punishment" by contrasting that con-
cept to the notion of "treatment." The term "treatment" he uses to
refer to assertedly nonpunitive coercive measures such as civil com-
mitment of the dangerously insane, deportation, disbarment, and im-
peachment and removal from office (p. 28). All of these measures, he
says, are intended to "deprive an individual of the status that enables
him or her to constitute a continuing social threat," rather than to
"expiate or atone for" some crime (p. 29).
But it is punishment - the "institution [that] provides the distin-
guishing features of criminal law" - that is Fletcher's main focus.
Here, Fletcher begins, as he did in Rethinking,"8 with H.L.A. Hart's
famous positivistic account of punishment, consisting of five elements:
(1) punishment must involve pain or other consequences normally
considered unpleasant, (2) it must be for an offense against legal rules,
(3) it must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offense, (4) it
must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the of-
fender, and (5) it must be imposed and administered by an authority
constituted by a legal system against which the offense is committed. 9
Fletcher then "de-positivises" Hart's definition by emphasizing the
phrase "for his offense" in the third element, and focusing on the con-
58. See FLETCHER, RETHINKING, supra note 1, at 409-12.
59. See H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in H.L.A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILrrY 4-5 (1968).
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ceptual link between the crime and the punishment. Punishment must
be imposed for the criminal act. "Strictly speaking," Fletcher says,
deportation for a heinous criminal act is not imposed for the criminal act;
it is carried out for the sake of protecting the public. Disbarment and
removal from office exhibit the same ambiguity. These sanctions may be
imposed in response to criminal behavior but they are carried out for the
sake of protecting the public. [pp. 34-35]
So can Fletcher's theory account for the Trobriand Island and con-
temporary Japanese criminal law practices described above? Let us
examine each system in turn. First, consider the Trobriand Islanders.
How would Fletcher's theory deal with Malinowski's claim that the
Trobriand islander who committed suicide after violating the tribe's
incest taboo was applying a legally approved, apparently paradigmatic,
penal sanction? Looking to Fletcher's rewriting of Hart's definition of
punishment, we see that conditions 1 and 2 (that punishment involve
pain or other unpleasant consequences and that it be of an actual of-
fender, respectively) are obviously both satisfied. So too, it seems, is
condition 3 (that it be for an offense against legal rules). But,
inasmuch as the suicide fails to satisfy condition 4 (that the punish-
ment be "intentionally administered by human beings other than the
offender"), it clearly fails the Hart/Fletcher test.
Even more troublesome, though, is condition 5. Would the suicide
meet the requirement that it "be imposed and administered by an
authority constituted by a legal system against which the offense is
committed"? Here we can see the potential difficulty of finding em-
pirical evidence to confirm or disprove Fletcher's purportedly univer-
sal theory. Malinowski, for his part, regards the suicide as a paradig-
matic function of Melanesian criminal justice. In Melanesian society,
he says, suicide has a "distinct legal aspect."' Two methods of suicide
are prescribed - lo'u (jumping off a palm tree) and soka (taking of
poison from the gall bladder of a globe-fish). Festive dress and orna-
mentation are worn. The suicide in this case occurred "in the presence
of a pronounced crime: the breach of totemic clan exogamy..., one
of the corner-stones of totemism, mother-right, and the classificatory
system of kinship."61
For Fletcher, then, the Trobriand suicide creates a dilemma analo-
gous to the one we saw above in the discussion of animal prosecutions.
Either the suicide is regarded as "treatment," or it falls outside the
punishment/treatment dichotomy entirely.
60. MALINOWSKI, supra note 43, at 94.
61. Id. at 78-79. For a skeptical view of Malinowski's assessment, see HOEBEL, supra
note 35, at 177-210 (criticizing Malinowski's methodology); Peter Sack, Punishment in
Melanesia and Kimati's Suicide. Instead of a General Report, in RECUEILS DE LA SOCItT9
JEAN BODIN POUR L'HISTOIRE COMPARATIVE DES INSTITUTIONS (Vol. LVIII )- LA
PEINE 421 (1991).
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A similar, though subtler, problem occurs in the case of contempo-
rary Japanese criminal justice. The Japanese system is striking for the
way in which it departs from our traditional Western notions of crimi-
nal justice. Rather than focus on either retribution or deterrence, the
Japanese system emphasizes rehabilitation and reintegration. Can
Fletcher's theory account for it?
Perhaps it can, but only with difficulty. On the one hand, the
Japanese ideal seems far from the civil commitment, deportation, dis-
barment and impeachment of the "treatment" model. Whereas each
of these processes is intended to separate the offender from society,
the Japanese model is intended to do just the opposite - namely, to
bring the offender back in. On the other hand, it is also probably
wrong to speak of the Japanese ideal as involving "punishment." Al-
though the Japanese model does satisfy conditions 2-5 of the
Hart/Fletcher test, it has difficulty satisfying condition 1 - that it "in-
volve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant" -
i.e., that it be punitive.' Like the Trobriand suicide, then, the modern
Japanese system of criminal justice seems to pose a serious challenge
to Fletcher's universal theory.
4. The Crime/Offender Dichotomy and Chinese Imperial Law
Among the numerous puzzling issues raised by Chinese imperial
criminal law is the harsh treatment meted out for what we would re-
gard as relatively minor acts of disobedience. A person who failed to
show the proper filial piety or fulfill various mourning rites was subject
to severe penalties. In light of modern criminal law, these practices
seem aberrant. Once again we need to ask: To what extent can
Fletcher's theory account for them?
One approach to this puzzle can be found in Chapter 5 of Basic
Concepts, which offers two sets of pertinent distinctions (both of which
will be familiar to readers of Rethinking3). The first is between crime
and offender. The term "crime" refers to an offense in the abstract.
The term "offender" refers to an actual person who has committed a
crime. The second distinction refers to two different ways in which a
criminal act can be wrong - either through wrongdoing or wrongful-
ness. Wrongdoing involves the violation of a victim's interest.
("Stabbing, poisoning, stealing, robbing, [and] breaking in all involve
wrongdoing" (p. 78)). Wrongfulness involves the violation of a legal
rule. (Homicide and theft involve wrongfulness (Id.)). As the crimi-
62. I say difficult, rather than impossible, because even the Japanese system will be
viewed by some defendants as punitive. Although "benevolent" and "paternalistic," the
Japanese system nevertheless entails both an intrusion on defendants' autonomy and some
degree of stigma. Thus, it is not correct to say that it is entirely non-punitive.
63. See FLETCHER, RETHINKING, supra note 1, at 455-59.
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nal law has become increasingly a product of legislation (rather than
judicial decisionmaking), Fletcher contends, its moral content has
tended to shift from wrongdoing to wrongfulness. The purpose of
punishing offenders, he says, "is rarely seen as an effort to restore the
moral order of the universe. The primary purpose is to defend the
authority of the state" (p. 80).
So how should one characterize the moral content of Chinese im-
perial offenses such as failing to show proper filial piety and observe
mourning rites? Having written previously about the significance of
defiance as an element of moral content in the criminal law, I am sym-
pathetic to Fletcher's distinction between wrongdoing and wrongful-
ness.' Nevertheless, it seems to me that Fletcher's moral matrix is still
too simplistic to account for criminal offenses of this sort. In Chinese
society, of course, lack of filial piety and failure to fulfill mourning
rights did involve violations of a legal rule. But they also involved
more. In addition to the two kinds of moral content Fletcher identifies
- violations of a particular victim's interests and violations of a legal
rule - we need also to consider harm to society's institutions and
violation of moral (as opposed to legal) norms.5 Although moral con-
tent of these sorts is often associated with the understandably contro-
versial criminalization of "morals offenses" (such as gambling, adul-
tery, and prostitution), it is also essential to uncontroversial criminal
offenses such as contempt, perjury, and obstruction of justice. Here,
in the context of lack of filial piety and failure to fulfill mourning rites,
it is precisely these two forms of moral content that would appear to
be present.
Fletcher's failure to offer a sufficiently broad account of moral
content also explains why his claim regarding the historical shift from
wrongdoing to wrongfulness is faulty. As we have seen, the history of
mediaeval Chinese law exemplifies a pattern of development that is
precisely the converse of Fletcher's claim (i.e., a shift from wrongful-
ness to wrongdoing, rather than the other way around). A longer and
wider comparative law perspective helps to show why the historical
trends are actually more complicated than implied by Fletcher's ac-
count.
CONCLUSION: "RETHINKING" BASIC CONCEPTS
Criticizing George Fletcher for being insufficiently comparativist is
a bit like denigrating the Pope for being insufficiently Catholic. It has
not been my intention to do so here. Rather, I have sought to go be-
yond the contemporary Anglo-American and European context in
64. See Smart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminali-
zation and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997).
65. See id. (discussing both kinds of moral content).
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which Fletcher often works masterfully, in order to test the specifically
universal and timeless claims of his theory.
Fletcher himself has recognized the need for such expanded analy-
sis. In the coming years, one can look forward to foreign editions of
Basic Concepts augmented by local criminal law materials. (It is un-
clear, though, whether any non-Western systems will be included.) In
the meantime, we can begin to assess the validity of Fletcher's claims
through an admittedly piecemeal and preliminary process of analysis.
The results of that initial assessment, I believe, are mixed. A brief
and anecdotal look at selected historical practices in Japan, Iceland,
China, Melanesia and elsewhere reveals a bewilderingly complex
range of conduct involving what we would recognize as criminal law:
animals and inanimate objects subject to prosecution and punishment,
suicide serving as a recognized criminal sanction, radically divergent
ideas about the purpose of criminal justice, non-complicit family
members being held liable for criminal acts of a related perpetrator,
and severe sanctions imposed for relatively minor acts of disobedi-
ence.
One is left, I hope, with a sense of how varied criminal law prac-
tices can be, and how difficult it is to construct a universal theory. The
reader cannot help but be impressed by what Fletcher has achieved.
Although Fletcher's claims to universality sometimes overreach, his
dichotomy theory is rich enough to provide the tools for analyzing
many of the examined anomalies. As the project to publish Basic
Concepts in various foreign editions takes shape, this richness should
become increasingly evident.
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THE TYRANNY OF MONEY
Edward J. McCaffery*
LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF
EXCESS. By Robert H. Frank. New York: The Free Press. 1999. Pp.
ix, 326. $25.
With the greater part of rich people, the chief enjoyment of riches con-
sists in the parade of riches, which in their eye is never so complete as
when they appear to possess those decisive marks of opulence which no-
body can possess but themselves.
-Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776
Great wealth cannot still hunger, but rather occasions more dearth; for
where rich people are, there things are always dear. Moreover, money
makes no man merry, but much rather pensive and full of sorrow.
-Martin Luther, Table Talk, LXXXII, 1569
Probably the greatest harm done by vast wealth is the harm that we of
moderate means do ourselves when we let the vices of envy and hatred
enter deep into our own natures.
-Theodore Roosevelt, Speech in Providence, Rhode Island,
August 23, 1902
I. INTRODUCTION
The more things change, the more they stay the same.
A human activity almost as venerable as the accumulation and
opulent display of vast riches is the condemnation of the accumulation
and opulent display of vast riches. People have been busily engaged at
each for several millennia now. Both continue in full flower as
America races into the twenty-first century with its liberal capitalist
democracy ascendant around the world, its rich richer than ever, its
less-rich curiously lagging behind.' Yet figuring out what, exactly, is
* Maurice Jones, Jr. Profzssor of Law, University of Southern California Law School
and Visiting Professor of Law and Economics, California Institute of Technology. B.A.
1980, Yale; J.D. 1985, Harvard; M.A., 1994, Southern Cal. - Ed. I thank Scott Altman,
Marshall Cohen, Carl Cranor, David Dolinko, Dan Klerman, Matt Spitzer, Eric Talley, and
the participants in the Southern California Law & Philosophy Discussion Group for helpful
comments, and Negin Mirmirani and Tim Lan for excellent research assistance.
1. For just some of the recent books on point, see ROBERT E. GOODIN ET AL., THE
REAL WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1999); FRANK LEVY, THE NEW DOLLARS AND
DREAMS (1998); EDWARD WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF
WEALTH IN AMERICA, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (rev. ed. 1996).
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wrong with the excessive accumulation and opulent display of wealth,
on the one hand, and then deciding what if anything to do about it, on
the other, have been among the most troubling issues of social theory
and political economy - far harder to pin down than the intuitive
sense that something is, indeed, wrong.
In his interesting, important, thoughtful, if sometimes wandering,
repetitive, and maddening recent book, Luxury Fever, the
psychologically-minded economist Robert Frank of Cornell University
- coauthor, with Philip J. Cook, of the related Winner Take All
Society,2 another widely accessible and important book - ventures
into this familiar domain. Part economics, part social psychology, part
autobiography, part cognitive psychology or behavioral economics,
part game theory, part evolutionary biology, part tax policy, and part a
journalistic foray into the lifestyles of the rich and famous in fin-de-
sicle America, Luxury Fever offers up both a view of the social
problems presented by luxurious living and a specific type of solution
to them. In short, Frank argues that much of our spending results
from a desire for relative status, leading us to want "positional goods";
since everyone else does likewise, we end up treading water with no
improvement in our subjective well-being or utility. We would all be
better off if we hopped off the treadmill and directed our limited
resources to nonpositional goods, including more savings, leisure, and
education, whose benefits endure. Frank argues that a progressive
consumption tax can help us all to escape in a "win-win" way from the
collective action problem of luxury fever. His description and
prescription each deserve to be thought through and taken seriously.
Luxury Fever is a good, important book.
I happen to agree with much of what Frank has to say about both
the nature of the disease and its remedy, curiously enough involving
tax policy.' Where I am skeptical is at the level of the whys - the pre-
cise connection between sickness and cure. It strikes me that Frank
plays too fast and loose here, and that it somehow matters, a point on
which Frank himself would agree ("ideas matter," he writes) (p. 267).
It strikes me, in fact, that what is omitted from Frank's style of analysis
is, in the end, more important than what is included.
2. ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER TAKE ALL SOCIETY: WHY THE
FEW AT THE TOP GET So MUCH MORE THAN THE REST OF US (1995).
3. For some of my own work on point, see Edward J. McCaffery, The Missing Links in
Tax Reform, 2 CHAPMAN L. REV. 233, 246 (1999) [hereinafter McCaffery, Missing Links];
Edward J. McCaffery, The Political Liberal Case Against the Estate Tax, 23 PHIL & PUB.
AFF. 281 (1994) [hereinafter McCaffery, Political Liberal Case]; Edward J. McCaffery, Real
Tax Reform: The Case for a Progressive Consumption Tax, BOSTON REV., Dec. 1999/Jan.
2000, at 46 [hereinafter McCaffery, Real Tax Reform]; Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Un-
der a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TExAS L. REv. 1145 (1992) [hereinafter
McCaffery, Hybrid]; Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation,
104 YALE LI. 283 (1994) [hereinafter McCaffery, Uneasy Case].
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But let us back up and begin where Frank himself does - with a
portrait of the nation as an ailing patient.
II. SICKNESS
Look around, and something indeed seems wrong in contemporary
America.
The beginning parts of Luxury Fever set out the problem in some-
times gory detail - our rich are richer than ever, and boy are they
flaunting it. As is perhaps to be expected, we learn about the author
himself indirectly - and sometimes quite directly - through his
choice of examples. Watches, household appliances (especially gas
grills), wines, fancy cars (more on these anon), and houses -
mansions, really - are the recurring motifs. In each case, the thing is
bigger, better, or faster - and always more expensive - than ever be-
fore.
My personal favorite example - the one I have been telling
friends and students about - is the Patek Phillipe watch that sold out
its limited run of four for a minimum of 2.7 million dollars per watch
(p. 16). This, I suppose, is the item on the book's jacket cover. Since
you might as well learn about me through reading this Review, I can
honestly say that I had never heard of Patek Phillipe until I read
Frank's book, although I live in the shadows of Beverly Hills. I also
take a perhaps perverse pride - more on this anon, too - in never
having spent more than $20 on a watch. Truth be told, when my
$19.95 Casio runs out, I often don't bother to replace its battery, which
costs $5.00, because it's easier just to get a new watch. Perhaps this
decadent impatience means I have a luxury head cold.
Returning to the more general malady, what exactly the root cause
of luxury fever is, or what exactly the best description of it might be,
varies a bit in Frank's text. But the symptoms are clear enough. We
are spending too much, on too frivolous things, and accordingly - by
the zero sum logic that pervades most of the book - we are spending
too little on good things, such as providing public goods and capital for
our personal and collective present and futures. We are wasting our
time and money on positional goods rather than on gains that endure.
Now as at least in part an economist (I have a master's degree in
the dismal science), I am obliged to point out that even wasteful, con-
spicuous consumption need not be a zero sum game. Perhaps the
ability to engage in luxurious spending is an important inducement to
greater productive activity in the first place. If the wealthy preeners
noticed by Adam Smith in the opening epigraph worked harder than
they otherwise would in order to be able to strut their stuff in public,
then the celebrated social pie would be larger on account of their per-
haps perverse motivation and the socially granted opportunity to sate
it. But much of Frank's analysis is static or partial equilibrium in the
2128 [Vol. 98:2126
HeinOnline  -- 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2128 1999-2000
The Tyranny of Money
economist's sense 4 In particular, Frank gives short shrift to the idea
that productivity might decrease under his ideal solution - a steeply
progressive consumption tax.
On this as on other points, I am certain that many, probably most,
professional economists will find Frank a better journalist or psy-
chologist than an economist, although he is indeed the latter. Much of
Luxury Fever reads like an amplification of various possible market
failures: externalities and public goods, primarily, but also signaling in
the presence of asymmetric information, and so on. Frank, as he does
in all of his work,5 enriches this standard homo economicus analysis
with some sense of "homo realisticus" (p. 248), namely that imper-
fectly rational creature who suffers from various cognitive heuristics
and biases, as chronicled by behavioral economists and decision theo-
rists such as Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Richard Thaler.
But when it comes to pure economics analysis, Frank is often defen-
sive (worrying about or dismissing what the "free marketeers," "liber-
tarians," or the "perfectly rational" crowd might think) on the one
hand, and imprecise on the other. It's all well and good to go beyond
the narrow, rational actor model, of course, but cognitive decision
theory - for all of its powerful insights - is notoriously unsystematic
and underdeterminative. Granted that we mere mortals overreact to
some things and underreact to others, but how can we tell which is
what?6 I doubt that Frank will assuage critics looking for any precise
and predictive model behind his polished popular prose.
To illustrate, Frank somewhat curiously calls the specific idea that
individuals will respond to incentives in the form of high tax rates on
consumption by working less "trickle down economics" (p. 226, pas-
sim). But the idea that people respond to incentives is quite general in
all rational choice social theory, as Frank elsewhere acknowledges (p.
228). The economist James Mirrlees, for example, received a Nobel
Prize in large part for his work on optimal taxation. Mirrlees's analy-
4. Frank does note in passing that: "Chaos theorists speak fancifully about how a butter-
fly's wings flapping in China might set off a chain of events that culminates in a hurricane in
the Caribbean," p. 222, and many of the economists he cites are indeed using general equi-
librium models. No such model, however, seems to lie too close to the surface in the text.
5. In addition to Luxury Fever, see FRANK & COOK, supra note 2, as well as ROBERT H.
FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS
(1985), and ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WrrHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EMOTIONS (1988).
6. This is a point I have tried to make in my own work. Another connection I have with
Frank is my own interest in cognitive psychology, which includes a project coauthored with
Kahneman. See Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on
Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REv. 1341 (1995) (with Daniel J. Kahneman and
Matthew L. Spitzer); Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REv.
1861 (1994); Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why it Matters, 1994 WiS.
L. REV. 71. For other treatments merging law and cognitive psychology, see generally
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000).
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sis falls far short of the pejorative lay idea of "trickle down" econom-
ics, and ends up pointing towards declining tax rates on upper-income
earners, even and maybe especially in the name of progressivity or re-
distribution.7
Frank's arguments against "trickle down" theorists, moreover, are
inconsistent. He argues that we will not respond to an economic in-
centive against luxurious living by working any less (Chapter Fifteen),
and thus that we will save more (pp. 233-35), but if we do work less,
this will be good, too, because it is good for us to work less and spend
more time relaxing and with our families (pp. 241-42, passim) - lei-
sure being a classic nonpositional good. Frank does not close the loop
by explaining how, if we all respond to a "steeply progressive" con-
sumption tax by spending more time with our families, we would still
get the "trillions of dollars" in benefits from more savings (p. 250, pas-
sim), except possibly for stating in passing that we should count the
value of leisure time in the national income accounts (p. 242), as if
this, alone, would help buy brick and mortar for public goods.
It is also unclear what the exact psychological mechanism behind
luxury fever is. Frank generally writes as if we are all the same, gov-
erned by inexorable laws of nature or the relentless pursuit of self-
interest, narrowly defined. But we are not all the same. Why do some
of us have the fever and others not? And if all or even many of us are
inevitably inclined towards conspicuous consumption, why would such
people ever save anything at all? Those concerned with only their
relative status might work even harder under a steeply progressive
consumption tax, still spend every penny they get, and all that would
result is more stress and possibly more tax dollars - which may be a
good thing but it is not going to cure anyone's fever. (It's also not the
kind of "simple and painless" "win-win" solution that Frank has in
mind, as I consider in Part IV.) This is the maddening part of Frank's
book - he sometimes wanders, makes debaters' points ("simply"
seems to be his favorite word, as in "there is simply no reason..."),
and generally oversells his conclusions. To a man with a hammer, eve-
rything looks like a nail. Any reader of Luxury Fever will sense early
on that Frank's view of human nature - as inexorably inclining us,
absent some collective coordination device, toward destructive con-
spicuous consumptive competition - is a hammer indeed.
In any event, Frank finds that we work too hard, stress out too
much, and seem to be no happier than if we did not do these things
(Chapter Five). Our savings rate is dangerously low (Chapter Seven)
7. See J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration of the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38
REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971); see also A.B. ATKINSON, PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN ACTION:
THE BASIC INCOME/FLAT TAx PROPOSAL (1995). For a helpful explanation of the optimal
tax literature and an application to progressive income taxation, see Joseph Bankman &
Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation,
75 CAL. L. REV. 1905 (1987).
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- it has actually fallen precipitously since Frank, using data from the
mid 1990s, sounded the alarm, although it is notoriously hard to meas-
ure.' Our spending on public goods of all sorts is also dangerously low
(Chapter Four); our schools, public health system, water, environ-
ment, inner cities, and infrastructure are all woefully underfunded. If
we could just shift from the rat-race treadmill of "conspicuous con-
sumption" to more important "inconspicuous" consumption (pp. 90-
92, passim) - more free time, more savings, more spending on public
goods - we would all be better off, probably in the increasingly fa-
miliar magnitude of "trillions of dollars."
So something is indeed wrong. We are addicted to the high life, ir-
resistibly tempted to keep up with (or, better,,to better) the Joneses,
for the quite precise reason that our relative status matters. This may
have something to do with our hard wiring - a law of the jungle thing.
Frank discusses evidence from evolutionary biologists about the col-
lectively foolish behavior of peacocks (their feathers are too big) or
elks (antlers, this time) (pp. 149-51). Or it may be done for perfectly
rational, cognitive, and instrumental reasons - a "signaling" thing.
Frank discusses the need (?) of job interviewees to have the best suits
(pp. 139-40), and, far less persuasively, of CEOs to have the biggest
mansions. "In the current environment, Bill Gates needs a $100 mil-
lion estate to signal that he is the captain among captains of industry"
(p. 160). Later, "[a]n American CEO needs a 15,000 square-foot man-
sion only because others of his station in life have houses that large"
(p. 217). Apparently, size really does matter.'
Presumably, my cheap watch aids me as an academic, as in signal-
ing to my dean that I could use a raise, although it is worth noting that
Thorstein Veblen, whom we shall revisit below, thought that the
scholarly class was most likely to over-extend itself in conspicuous
consumption, in an attempt to keep up with the wealthier classes with
whom academics inevitably mingle? But Veblen was a notorious
grouch, and maybe I am just an obtuse academic. In any event, Frank
thinks that we end up doing things that are "smart" (or at least really
difficult to resist) "for one, but dumb for all" (Chapter Ten).
8. See, e.g., Daniel Larkins, Note on the Personal Savings Rate, 79 SuRv. CURRENT
BUs., Feb. 1999, at 8.
9. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 113-14 (B.W.
Huebsch ed., 1924):
In any modem community where there is no priestly monopoly of these [scholarly] occupa-
tions, the people of scholarly pursuits are unavoidably thrown into contact with classes that
are pecuniarily their superiors. The high standard of pecuniary decency in force among
these superior classes is transfused among the scholarly classes with but little mitigation of its
rigour-, and as a consequence there is no class of the community that spends a larger propor-
tion of its substance in conspicuous waste than these.
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III. PRESCRIPTION
Having set out the problem, Frank poses a solution that will seem
alien to many readers but is quite close to my own heart and work -
use the tax system. Frank argues for a progressive consumption tax, a
fairly old idea in the academic literature. Frank credits Hobbes,
Hume, and others with the idea (pp. 212, 223). The more specific idea
of a "cash flow" expenditure or progressive consumption tax was per-
haps best developed by the eminent British economist Nicolas Kaldor
(he of Kaldor-Hicks fame) in a 1955 text, although Kaldor himself was
never all that clear on the moral and political bases of the idea."° In
this country, the Harvard Law professor William Andrews, one of my
teachers, most famously developed the idea in the legal literature in
the early 1970s.11 It was picked up in an influential Treasury Depart-
ment study authored by David Bradford and others in the late 1970s,
and became the intellectual underpinning for the Nunn-Domenici
USA ("unlimited savings accounts") tax plan, put forward in Congress
in the 1990s.12
A progressive cash flow consumption tax is a wonderfully simple
idea. To understand it, start with the Haig-Simons definition of in-
come, which holds, in simplified form, that Income equals Consump-
tion plus Savings (I = C + S).13 This tells us no more and no less than
that sources equal uses or, even more basically, that all wealth is either
spent (C) or not (S). By rearranging the simple identity, we get the
key insight of a cash flow consumption tax:
C=I-S
That is, Consumption equals Income minus Savings. Add up your in-
come, as we do each year on our dreaded 1040 forms, then subtract
your savings, and you are left with consumption - you spent that
which you made but did not save. To this base it is a simple matter -
as simple as in the case of an income tax - to apply progressive mar-
ginal rates.
Frank sees a progressive consumption tax as a solution to the col-
lective action problem posed by luxury fever. This is consistent with
10. See NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955); see also Nicholas Kaldor,
Comments to William D. Andrews, A Supplemental Personal Expenditure Tax, in WHAT
SHOULD BE TAXED, INCOME OR EXPENDITURE?, at 151 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980).
11. See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Case Flow Personal Income Tax,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974) [hereinafter Andrews, Personal Income Tax]; William D.
Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972) [here-
inafter Andrews, Deductions].
12. See LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, TE USA TAX (1997); see also DAVID F. BRADFORD
& U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1st ed.
1977).
13. See McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 3, at 1149.
2132 [Vol. 98:2126
HeinOnline  -- 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2132 1999-2000
The Tyranny of Money
either the view that excessive consumption is an arms-race type prob-
lem (everybody is in a mad and counterproductive race to be the
brightest peacock) or with the idea, not necessarily connected, that
consumption decisions are interdependent (one person's choices affect
others), and thus that there are classic externalities involved. In either
case unilateral actions - "self help," as Frank calls them (Chapter
Twelve) - are limited or altogether unavailing.
While traditional economists at least since Thomas Schelling have
understood the game theoretic structure of arms race problems,14 they
are reluctant to invoke interdependent preferences, because these de-
stroy the firm conclusions of general equilibrium theory.5 This is akin
to the need for welfare economics or rational choice theory to rule out
envy, for otherwise Paretian norms are unavailing.16 Frank's point
about the interconnectedness of preferences and feelings of self-worth
(language he does not use) is an important and valuable one to stress.
It provides an argument for consumption taxation not widely empha-
sized in the mainly economics literature arguing for such a tax. It also
resonates with the social contractarian thought of Rawls, sounding in
the interconnectedness of individuals in a well ordered society and,
importantly, with the primary good of the "social bases of self-
respect.,1 7 This is not, however, Frank's lingua franca, as we shall see.
In recommending some form of consumption tax, Frank is clearly
in step with the times." But Frank also favors - and here he is clearly
out of step with the times - "a steeply progressive consumption tax," a
phrase he repeats many times over. Just how steep? Frank states that
the USA Tax, which had rates ranging up to 40%, was not steep
enough (p. 225). In a perhaps significant glitch, in the one place he
sets out a specific rate structure (p. 213), he produces a chart of "tax
rates on taxable consumption" that stops at a 70% marginal rate for
consumption between $500,000 and $999,999. But this wouldn't even
cover a single Patek Phillipe watch purchase. Bill Gates, with his
14. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE (1966); THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, STRATEGY OF CoNFLIcr (1960).
15. See ROBIN W. BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 113 (1984) ("The
first theorem of welfare economics will generally fail in the presence of jointness of con-
sumption"); Martin Shubik, Pecuniary Externalities: A Game Theoretic Analysis, 61 AM.
ECON. REV. 713 (1971).
16. See, e.g., Y. NG, WELFARE ECONOMICS 31-32 (1980); Geoffrey Brennan, Pareto De-
sirable Redistribution: The Case of Malice and Envy, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 173 (1973); Guido
Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE LJ. 1211, 1216-18
(1991); Lawrence G. Sager, Pareto Superiority, Consent, and Justice, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
913,917-18 (1980).
17. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM]; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE].
18. See, e.g., McCaffery, Missing Links, supra note 3; McCaffery, Real Tax Reform, su-
pra note 3.
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45,000 square foot mansion, surely spends more than one million dol-
lars a year - he has to, to show that he is the "captain among captains
of industry." Just how high would Frank's rates go?
There is not a lot of detail in Frank's discussion of taxes. This
might be just as well, given the public's distaste for reading anything
about taxes other than how to avoid them or why they are evil. And
Frank has certainly written a widely accessible book, for which he de-
serves a great deal of credit. But one omission is particularly unfortu-
nate. Frank does not mention the tax treatment of debt, except in
passing to say that borrowing is a transition issue (p. 224). But a post-
paid consumption or expenditure tax must include debt in its base or
the game is over.
The reason is simple enough to see. If we allow people a deduc-
tion for savings, as a cash-flow consumption tax such as Frank pro-
poses would do, but then do not pick up borrowing within the tax
base, people can save on the one hand and borrow with the other.
The result is lots of consumption, no net savings - and no tax. This
situation obtains today because of the numerous exceptions for the
present taxation of savings under the so-called income tax. Chief
among these is the realization requirement, which holds that no tax
falls due until the ultimate sale or other disposition of an appreciating
asset.19 When the value of Bill Gates's Microsoft stock increased from
$50 to $100 billion dollars in a recent year, for example, Gates paid no
tax on that "mere appreciation." If Gates were to borrow against that
appreciation - presumably he can get pretty good credit card interest
rates - and consume away, he would still pay no tax. If he dies with
both appreciated assets and significant debt, his heirs can sell off the
stock, pay off the debt - and pay no tax.2' Such is the tax system our
great capitalist democracy has given itself.
It may still sound odd to include borrowing in the tax base. But
recall that there will be a deduction for savings, C = I - S, so borrowing
that leads to savings will trigger both an inclusion (as I) and a deduc-
tion (as S), and thereby cancel out. On the other hand, borrowing to
finance present consumption will generate tax. This is what we should
want under a tax system that effects its levies on the basis of "private
preclusive use," as Andrews phrased the matter.1 It works just like a
sales tax - you pay sales tax, without any question, when you buy
goods using a credit card. Frank's proposal is, in essence, for a pro-
19. Andrews refers to Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), as the Achilles' heel of
the tax system. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 11, at 1129-30; see also
McCaffery, Real Tax Reform, supra note 3.
20. See I.R.C. §1014 (1994) (stepped-up basis for assets acquired from a decedent).
21. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 11, at 1155-57.
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gressive national sales tax, as I have independently called the idea in
my own work 2
There is a lot to be said for such a consistent, progressive consump-
tion tax. One very large problem with the current tax system is its
incoherent and unprincipled blending of consumption and income tax
elements, which leads to the arbitrage operation I described above.
We save without paying tax under a consumption tax model (as within
tax-favored pension plans or IRAs, or via the realization require-
ment); then we borrow and spend away under the income tax model,
which does not tax debt. This means that there can be consumption
without taxation - that the way things are is upside down compared
to where Frank, myself, and others would put them. This also means
that a consistent consumption tax will have a very important base-
broadening effect, one that commentators on tax policy typically ig-
nore. While the systematic deduction for savings will shrink the tax's
base, the systematic inclusion of debt-financed consumption will in-
crease it. Combined with the fact that we need have no preferential
rates for capital gains under a consistent cash flow consumption tax, it
is far from clear that a "revenue neutral" conversion to a consumption
tax will mean any increase in the rate structure at all. I'll come back to
this idea later.
A final and related point that Frank, not a public finance or tax
theorist, fails to stress is how close the current system already is to a
consumption tax) Perhaps this is because Frank wants to emphasize,
at least at times, the "radical" aspect of his proposal (p. 223, passim).
To be fair, Frank's proposal is radical in today's political climate. But
its radicalism relates to the nature of Frank's arguments for it, and,
more so, to its rate structure. As a matter of. the tax base - of the
"what" of taxation, as opposed to the "how much" - we already
largely have a consumption tax. Since all income is either consumed
or saved, and we do not tax much savings as is, we are mostly taxing
spending: the luxuries that Frank describes are already being pur-
chased with after-tax dollars. The two major differences between the
status quo and Frank's proposal would be higher tax rates and, again
ideally, the inclusion of debt-financed consumption.
A powerful argument for moving all the way towards a consump-
tion tax is that life in the middle is precarious.24 The USA Tax plan,
for example, which did not feature "steeply" progressive rates, was not
a terribly radical idea: in a nutshell, you can get there by "simply" re-
pealing the limits on tax-deductible IRA contributions (although you
must then include borrowing as income, as the USA plan tragically did
22. See, e.g., McCaffery, Missing Links, supra note 3, at 250-51.
23. See, e.g., McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 3, at 1152-55.
24. See generally id.; see also McCaffery, Real Tax Reform, supra note 3, at 47.
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not)?5 Frank may be doing a disservice to the public political culture,
not well versed in tax policy by any means, by confusing the base and
rate issues, and making a consumption tax, per se, appear to be a radi-
cal idea. But he is surely to be commended for adding to and broad-
ening the popular understanding of a very important public policy
proposal.
IV. DIAGNOSIS
Something is wrong with our wealthiest citizens flaunting the luxu-
rious life, and all or at least many of us following in their shadows.
The tax system can be part of the solution to this thing. So far, so
good. But what, exactly, is it that's wrong? Consider four possibili-
ties:
1. Luxury fever is immediately irrational or self-harming, in that it
does not even bring pleasure to the individual patient, so to
speak; it has the structure of an addiction. Moralists like
Luther, in the opening epigraph, clearly held this sentiment. If
true, curbing the fever is in everyone's interest, and so the solu-
tion is, in welfarist terms, strictly Pareto superior. In the lan-
guage of modem welfare theory, this is a subjective, ordinal,
but paternalistic argument.
2. Luxury fever is individually rational in isolation, but irrational
in the aggregate - it is "smart for one, dumb for all," as Frank
repeatedly (but not consistently) puts it; the disease thus has
the structure of a prisoner's dilemma or arms race type prob-
lem. This is because status - which matters, according to
Frank, for a variety of instrumental and material reasons, in-
cluding health (pp. 140-45) - is a relative construct, leading us
to crave positional goods. Everyone wants the fastest car or the
most expensive watch, just because it is the fastest or the most
expensive. But the social race to obtain the fastest and the
most expensive positional goods is collectively foolish. Curbing
the fever is a matter of devising the correct collective coordina-
tion device that will again be, in welfarist terms, Pareto supe-
rior. This is classic subjective, ordinal welfarism without pater-
nalism.
3. Luxury fever can be enduringly rational on the individual level
- it really is good to be king - but is bad for the collective be-
cause the losers' pain is worse than the winners' gains, and the
whole game leads to a loss in aggregate welfare. A collective
action solution that in part redistributes wealth is to be pre-
ferred. But this can no longer be on Paretian grounds, as there
25. See SEIDMAN, supra note 12, at 31-32.
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are now "losers" in the realignment. It must rest rather on
straight utilitarian (or "Kaldor-Hicks") grounds, looking to
"the greater net balance of social well-being," as Rawls would
put it' 6 This is subjective cardinal welfarism, a strand of theory
currently very much in vogue in the legal academy 7
4. Luxury fever is, well, just plain wrong, quite apart from (though
not indifferent to) its consequential effects. This is as a matter
of basic social justice and fairness, in the spirit of Kant or
Rawls. Such a social contractarian theory makes reference to
objective social values and our moral obligations to others. It
steps outside subjectivism alone.
Frank does not clearly separate the first three arguments. But he is
decisively, and consistently, in one of them. He is, in other words, a
thoroughgoing, subjective welfarist. It is Frank's clear desire to press
the second argument, though he sometimes slips into the third -
where I believe the argument better rests. But to my sensibilities, the
most glaring omission in Frank's analysis is that he never approaches
the fourth argument - the broader one incorporating objective moral
reasoning.
As best I can tell, the word "moral" appears only twice in Luxury
Fever (words such as "duty," "obligation," "justice," and "fairness" or
their cognates fare no better; "fairness," for example, is discussed only
briefly, referring to empirical studies assessing the effect of the percep-
tion of fairness, not fairness itself, on individual behavior (p. 116)).
Frank first uses "moral" when he explains his general approach in the
book:
This diagnosis of why our current spending patterns are problematic sug-
gests the possibility, at least in principle, of reducing the speed of the
consumption treadmill, thereby freeing up resources that can be put to
various uses that would make more of a difference in our lives. For now,
I will say only that this can be accomplished in a simple and painless way.
My case for change is purely pragmatic, one based on self-interest alone.
It rests not on the social critic's claim that luxury consumption is self-
indulgent or decadent, but rather on detailed and persuasive scientific
evidence that if we adopt a simple change in the incentives we face, all of
us can expect to live longer, healthier, and more satisfying lives.
26. John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 532 (1980).
27. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 1998; RICHARD
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY(1999) [hereinafter POSNER,
PROBLEMATICS]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient
than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1984) [hereinafter
Kaplow & Shavell, Redistributing Income]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Principles of
Fairness Versus Human Welfare: On the Evaluation of Legal Policy, Discussion Paper No.
277, Harvard Law School (Mar. 2000) <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olincenter>.
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Yet it would be a mistake not to acknowledge that the case for changing
our current consumption patterns entails a moral dimension as well....
[p. 11-12; emphasis added]
One page later, however, Frank is backing off the "moral dimension,"
reiterating that his "aim is not to scold but to describe a striking set of
possibilities" (p. 13). With that, he is off, down a road that explores
the first three arguments, largely the second - trying to find a "simple
and painless" way to help "all of us" to "live longer, healthier, and
more satisfying lives." This culminates in a systemic solution that can
enable "luxury without apology" (Chapter Fourteen).
Now who, perchance, can argue with that? Frank indeed com-
ments on why his "simple and painless" and Paretian solution has not
already happened; basically, he blames cognitive misunderstanding
and a bad political system (pp. 224-26). But for these problems, we
could arrive at the promised land of steeply progressive consumption
taxation, apparently without any "moral dimension" to the argument
at all.
So Frank leaves himself with some kind of subjective welfarist ar-
gument, and he moves around, rather uneasily, among the three basic
possibilities. Early in Luxury Fever, Frank seems to be saying the first
- people work hard to obtain rather silly things, and it certainly
seems as if they would be happier if they could just jump off the
treadmill. Frank does not push this line of inquiry, although it does
recur. It is clearly not his major point; he backs off from it in the mid-
dle chapters, where he is more often somewhere between the second
and third arguments.
Ironically, though, there is something to be said for this first point,
even in the nonconsequentialist terms I mean to press. Maybe too
much luxury is a bad thing, and a manifestation of this is that at least
the otherwise moral person who engages in excessive luxury for
whatever reason is left to feel pangs of guilt on this account. Luther
thought that "money makes no man merry, but rather pensive and full
of sorrow."29 Garry Wills describes Thomas Jefferson, perhaps
America's first great excessive consumer, as also being conflicted
about his own possibly tragic lack of thrift.3" Roberto Unger, a leading
advocate of restoring a richer, normative vision of human nature to
legal scholarship, argues that luxurious living alienates man from his
own true nature and his fellow man. 1 The fabulous scale of human
28. Compare Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100
YALE L.J 1211 (1991).
29. See opening epigraph: MARTIN LUTHER, TABLE TALK 82 or LXXXII (William
Hazlitt trans., Fount Paperbacks 1995) (1569) (posthumous).
30. Garry Wills, Storm over Jefferson, N.Y. REvIEw OF BOOKS, Mar. 23, 2000, at 1618.
31. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY
(1984).
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wealth today certainly allows our best dressed peacocks to far outstrip
the rest of the flock in a way inconceivable to other species; one really
can end up all dressed up with nowhere to go, as the archetypal Kane
learned too late for his own subjective well being.
Frank also has a problem here, as elsewhere, with his tendency to
reduce human nature to universal essences. If biology leads all people
to compete for status - if we all have the fever - it is not clear that
anything can change us. But if, as certainly seems to be the case, only
some of us have the fever, why cannot Frank argue that those without
it are better off than those with it? This indeed seems to be one of the
points of his discussion of individual savings behavior (pp. 98-100);
spenders are penny-wise and pound-foolish on their own lights. The
possibility of individual myopia has led some scholars to suggest ex-
plicitly paternalistic social savings policies.32 But Frank is, for all of his
wide reading and interdisciplinary range, a contemporary economist
and social scientist first and foremost. Like his fellow travelers, he
wants to stick with Paretian norms and to avoid paternalism at all
costs (p. 273, passim). He cannot reside happily in the domain of this
first argument, which holds that at least some people are behaving
foolishly on their own lights.
This leads Frank to the second argument, the collective action
problem - that we could all be happier if we stopped the insanity of
excessive conspicuous consumption, so to speak. This argument is
Frank's most original and important contribution to the public policy
debate. It is a nice and interesting insight, and it might well be true in
some cases and to some degree. But it does not seem all that tenable
as a global matter of practical or political reality. Does Frank really
believe that high spending Americans would be better off under a con-
sumption tax with marginal rates ranging in excess of 70%? Or that
they would find this solution "simple and painless"? If so, it would
"simply" be a case of convincing them of this reality. Read this book
and repent, ye self-interested fools of little faith!
Yet Frank clearly (or "simply") does mean to be saying this. Con-
cluding his panegyric in favor of a steeply progressive consumption
tax, he writes:
The catch? There is none. The extraordinary beauty of the progressive
consumption tax is its ability to generate extra resources almost literally
out of thin air. It is a win-win move, even for the people on whom the
tax falls most heavily. [p. 224]
Frank returns to this theme again and again; the book ends with a sub-
section entitled "money for nothing" (p. 279).
32- See, e.g., Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy, 58 U. CM. L. REv. 1275
(1991).
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Perhaps Frank really believes his own rhetoric. But it hardly
seems satisfactory as an all-encompassing view of human nature,
American society, or modern times. Unless we are saying that the rich
are spending too much as is under their own lights - the dreaded pa-
ternalism point - it must be the case that they are only spending at
high levels because of relative status issues, which they cannot avoid
for biological or rational reasons - we are all peacocks or job-seekers,
in the end. Is this true? There are of course other reasons to spend -
most of which, absent an elaborate array of deductions, would be
taxed under Frank's steeply progressive consumption scheme.
Spending on private education, health, or security may not be con-
spicuous or positional at all, but such spending, left unlimited, might
still be unfair. In any event, if all that some or most of us cared about
were relative status, why would things be any different under a steeply
progressive consumption tax? Isn't it possible that we would save
even less, and work even more, to hold true to our peacockian na-
tures?
Frank never discusses in his rich book the fact that most rich
Americans are not like his consumption-obsessed paradigm at all.
Most millionaires seem to be frugal, and most elderly wealthy people
continue to save, not dissave as both standard economic theory and
Frank's "homo realisticus" model both suggest that they should. Ac-
cording to the popular best seller, The Millionaire Next Door, 10% of
America's millionaires have never spent more than $47 for a watch
(there is hope for me yet); 50% have never spent more than $235, and
only 1% have ever spent more than $15,000. 33 Granted that there is a
self-selection involved - frugal people are more likely to become
millionaires in the first place - there is still obvious self-restraint
against the fever out there. Frank's only explanation of such frugality
and thrift, within his own terms, is that such people are constrained by
"social norms," a limited and unsatisfying placeholder for some sense
of moral convention or propriety. I'll revisit social norms below.
As for my own humble scholarly self, I do not personally think that
my simple, inexpensive watch is a signal of my unconcern with mate-
rial pleasures, or a biological attempt to find a mate with similar values
so that we can perpetuate a more Kantian species. Truth be told, I
would find it unconscionable personally to spend thousands, let alone
millions, on a watch, and I don't much care what my fellow persons
think. If I had such millions (I don't), I would want to save them, or
give them to charity; I certainly would not want to wear them on my
wrist. I think I am autonomous in this thinking; maybe I am deceiving
myself. But we can all at least hope - or pretend - that I am not.
33. See THOMAS J. STANLEY & WILLIAM D. DANKO, THE MILLIONAIRE NExT DOOR:
THE SURPRISING SECRETS OF AMERICA'S WEALTHY 32 (1996).
2140 [Vol. 98:2126
HeinOnline  -- 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2140 1999-2000
The Tyranny of Money
The fact that many of us are savers does not argue against a pro-
gressive consumption tax: far from it. That such a tax is consonant
with basic American values makes it more, not less, likely to succeed?"
It does, however, change the argument structure. Since excessive lux-
ury spending is no longer an unavoidable fact of nature, we can argue
against it in moral and/or redistributive terms, as Frank does not.
More generally, live by the sword, die by the sword. If the empiri-
cal evidence for Frank's claims under this second argument founder -
and these are very stringent empirical claims indeed, given the insis-
tence on at least a near unanimity condition that the Pareto (or win-
win) principle requires - so do his claims themselves. Early on in the
book Frank presents evidence that money, at least above a certain
level, does not buy happiness (Chapter Five). Now I think there is
room to quibble with these studies; some people, such as the Japanese
in one study Frank cites, seem to say that they are always moderately
happy, which is not such a bad state of mind to carry through life's vi-
cissitudes (or at least to tell a surveyor). But granted that such meas-
ures of subjective well-being capture the status quo, what if the num-
bers change? What if - as I suspect is increasingly true in America
since the Reagan Revolution helped to legitimate greed and lessen the
guilt of the good life - people really start becoming happier by
spending more on themselves? Or what if we could make them hap-
pier, not by a "steeply progressive consumption tax," but rather by the
"simple and painless" step of convincing Americans to overcome their
puritanical opposition to luxuries, along with all notions of envy and
guilt? Would that justify "luxury without apology"?
Another problem with Frank's second argument circles back to an
omitted aspect of the tax discussion. Frank makes a common mistake
in thinking that a move to a consumption tax must decrease consump-
tion and increase savings. It need not. The form of the tax system is
neutral as to the aggregate level of capital savings." I personally be-
lieve that we can and should have a consistent consumption tax be-
cause it would lead to a better, fairer, more sensible version of what
we have now. A progressive consumption tax would get wealthy peo-
ple consuming out of capital to pay some tax, and would give all the
rich a choice of how to serve the public good - through ostensibly
private savings that add to the common capital stock, or through the
progressive taxes levied on their choice of lifestyle. 6 But the corre-
34. This argument is central in Edward J. McCaffery, Tax's Empire, 85 GEO. L. REV. 71,
106-07 (1996) [hereinafter McCaffery, Tax's Empire]; see also McCaffery, Uneasy Case, su-
pra note 3, at 345.
35. See Edward J. McCaffery, Being the Best We Can Be (A Reply to My Critics), 51
TAX L. REV. 615 (1996) [hereinafter McCaffery, Being the Best].
36. Note that by allowing a deduction for charities, we could give the rich their choice.
See McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 257-58.
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sponding higher revenue from a more inclusive tax base, higher rates
on big spenders, and lower costs of capital, could be used "simply" to
lower taxes on middle class consumption.
In other words, a consistent and progressive consumption tax could
get and allow the rich to save, and then stop trying to get the middle
classes to do so. Much of current tax policy has been obsessed with a
targeted and probably futile attempt to do just the opposite. 7 There is
much to be said for both the fairness and the efficiency of allowing
those with the most to save save, and leaving the rest of us, many of
whom live from paycheck to paycheck, alone. But if Frank's picture
of human nature is correct, this use of a steeply progressive consump-
tion tax move would only free up the middle classes to get on, or speed
up, their own consumption treadmills. Veblen was well aware that this
could happen - that luxury fever has its analogs among the lower
economic classes. 8 But such greater spending by the middle classes
would in turn push those up the ladder to fret that they must compete
more. This would certainly make them feel unhappy - thanks, but no
thanks - with Frank's "painless and simple" plan to make us all bet-
ter off.
A steeply progressive consumption tax that self-consciously aimed
to reduce present consumption, or to shift work into leisure, in con-
trast, will have redistributive effects across generations and among
people with different preferences. It will fall on spending on nonposi-
tional as well as on positional goods, though the motive for the former,
by definition, cannot revolve around a concern for relative status. It is
not a "painless and simple," "win-win" kind of deal, and I sense that
Frank has done a disservice in the midst of his generally noble public
service by overselling this point. Not everything is a nail, after all,
even to a man with an especially elegant hammer.
This all leads to the third argument - that a progressive consump-
tion tax is justified on classical utilitarian grounds, redistribution and
all. Frank is extremely tentative in endorsing this view, and does not
really flatly come out and say it. He sometimes makes a nod, as Rich-
ard Posner does, to quasi-Paretianism, weakening the unanimity con-
dition.39 But he wants to pull up short, to stick to this we-would-all-be-
better-off line, implausible as it may seem. It is also more than a little
sad that Frank feels he must argue this way.
37. See McCaffery, Real Tax Reform, supra note 3, at 47.
38. VEBLEN, supra note 9, at 36.
39. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 27.
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V. ARE WE ALL HETERONOMOUS Now?
Ultimately, Frank's book rather unwittingly illustrates what I take
to be the single greatest challenge to normative social and legal theory
as it is practiced in law schools and elsewhere. I suspect that the most
common criticisms of Luxury Fever will come from economics sorts
frustrated with the absence of more formal analytic rigor, a point that
Frank repeatedly anticipates and that I touched on in Part II. But I
am more troubled by the virtually complete absence of explicit moral
theorizing, a point that Frank all but ignores.
A book on the topic of luxurious living could "simply" not have
been written at any time in recorded history until the last few years
without some discussion of moral theory. Frank repeatedly credits
Adam Smith, quite properly, with beginning the line of inquiry. Smith
was certainly sensitive to the moral dimensions of the story; he was a
professor of moral philosophy, after all, most proud of his own Theory
of Moral Sentiments, who infused the far more widely cited Wealth of
Nations with ethical concerns. Amartya Sen has complained about the
reductionist reading of Smith, stripping this rich thinker of his moral
dimensions:
[I]t is precisely the narrowing of the broad Smithian view of human be-
ings, in modem economies, that can be seen as one of the major deficien-
cies of contemporary economic theory. This impoverishment is closely
related to the distancing of economics from ethics'
With Sen's view in mind, it is especially troubling not only that Frank
repeatedly reduces Smith to a prophet of self-interest (p. 171), but also
that he should give Charles Darwin pride of place over Smith among
"the only two men" from whom "our modem understanding of com-
petition derives almost entirely": "Smith's view was by far the more
optimistic, but Darwin's more hard-edged analysis holds the key to
understanding our current situation" (p. 146). Apparently we persist
perilously close to the ethical awareness of peacocks.
Darwin influenced Thorstein Veblen, the most important precur-
sor to Frank's effort - although he only receives a passing mention in
the text (p. 14). This is unfortunate, for Veblen is a subtle and inter-
esting thinker who deserves more study today. He wrote widely in
criticism of economists and on the connections among religion, cul-
ture, morals and competitive economic systems.41 Consider his analy-
sis of "waste," both the term and the concept, in The Theory of the
40. AMARTYA SEN, ON ETICS & ECONOMICS 28 (1987).
41. See generally A VEBLEN TREASURY: FROM LEISURE CLASS TO WAR, PEACE, AND
CAPITALISM (Rick Tilman ed., 1993).
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Leisure Class.42 Veblen first notes that the conspicuous consumption
of the rich must be wasteful:
Throughout the entire evolution of conspicuous expenditure, whether of
goods or of services or of human life, runs the obvious implication that in
order to effectually mend the consumer's good fame it must be an ex-
penditure of superfluities. In order to be reputable it must be wasteful.
43
Interestingly, Frank is never prepared to go this far; he does not gen-
erally question whether there is some detached, objective benefit to a
luxury good. Veblen simply asserts that positional goods at the upper
reaches must be wasteful.
Veblen, however, has a problem here. Like Frank, Veblen is
clearly trying to be a classical social scientist. He wants to avoid ques-
tioning individual rationality. Veblen thus notes a problem with the
moralistic flavor to the word "waste":
The use of the term "waste" is in one respect unfortunate. As used in the
speech of everyday life the word carries an undertone of deprecation ....
It is here called "waste" because this expenditure does not serve human
life or human well-being on the whole, not because it is waste or misdi-
rection of effort or expenditure as viewed from the standpoint of the in-
dividual consumer who chooses it. If he chooses it, that disposes of the
question of its relative utility to him, as compared with other forms of
consumption that would not be deprecated on account of their wasteful-
ness.4
Veblen, like Frank, wants to avoid paternalism, so he allows the indi-
vidual's decision to be dispositive of his own self-interest. But Veblen
goes far further than Frank ever does, because he does not confine
himself to Paretian outcomes. Veblen goes back to the use of the
"term 'waste' in the language of everyday life" and explains the reason
it "implies deprecation of what is characterized as wasteful":
In order to meet with unqualified approval, any economic fact must ap-
prove itself under the test of impersonal usefulness - usefulness as seen
from the point of view of the generically human. Relative or competitive
advantage of one individual in comparison with another does not satisfy
the economic conscience, and therefore competitive expenditure has not
the approval of this conscience.45
In one fell swoop, Veblen goes where Frank fears to tread: he gives us
a reason to curb "luxury fever," which he calls "competitive
expenditure," not by a necessarily "simple and painless" "win-win"
means, but so as to satisfy the dictates of an "economic conscience."
42. VEBLEN, supra note 9, at 97-101. I discuss the concept of waste in Edward J.
McCaffery, Must We Have the Right to Waste?, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (Steven Munzer ed., forthcoming 2000).
43. VEBLEN, supra note 9, at 96.
44. Id. at 97-98.
45. Id. at 98.
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This collective sensibility is grounded in objective, interpersonal
values, and located in the domain of ordinary language and moral
sentiment. Veblen is thus somewhere between the third and fourth
arguments above; the conspicuous expenditures of the rich are bad
from an impartial spectator's point of view, whether that point of view
is a classical utility-based one (as in argument 3) or a moral, social
contractarian one (as in argument 4). A similar structure of argument,
including the discussion of popular morality, is still present at the time
of Tibor Scitovsky's 1976 classic, The Joyless Economy: An Inquiry
into Human Satisfaction and Consumer Dissatisfaction, another
important (and relatively neglected) precursor to Frank's
contemporary effort. These old arguments continue to have fresh
force. Frank deserves credit for developing and pressing the clever
second argument for a "win-win" change, but, ultimately, he might be
wrong to put too much weight on it.46
Frank certainly emerges from a close reading of Luxury Fever as a
good and decent man. We learn along the way that he had served
time in the Peace Corps with his wife of long standing. He loves
Ithaca's college community. He thinks twice about owning really nice
cars - he did not buy a well-priced Porsche when he had the chance
in the 1980s, although he now drives a BMW (pp. 168-69, 203). (Frank
also concedes late in the day that he now also has a gas range with two
15,000 Btu burners - which he considers "the signature emblem of
1990s superfluity" - but he takes some comfort in noting that he does
not have four such burners, as some fellow Ithacans have (p. 266).)
He cares about his children and their education, and is respectful to-
wards his wife. Most importantly for the present purposes, of course,
Frank has dedicated much of his considerable intellectual gifts to try-
ing to understand what might be wrong with an economic structure -
advanced liberal market capitalism - that all too many people are
simply celebrating as ideal. In Luxury Fever and in his other works he
has crossed disciplines and written with sensitivity and grace about
how to make the world a better, happier place.
But must Frank defend his rich ideas in the often impoverished
language of subjective welfarism? Perhaps ordinal utilitarianism has
become the lingua franca of normative social theory today, but that
does not mean it is right - and that we all must end up arguing over
the facts of the matter instead of their basic social justice.47 The sec-
ond time I found the word "moral" in Luxury Fever came very late in
the day, when Frank writes about a public employment program. He
46. See Cass R. Sunstein, Vanity Fair, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 29, 1999, at 13 (re-
viewing LuXuRY FEvER) ("[Frank's] argument is both... plausible and ingenious... but I
am not sure Frank is right.").
47. See id. (questioning Frank's facts).
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thinks that this program would be a good place to spend the savings
from a progressive consumption tax:
Completely apart from our moral responsibility to provide the best pos-
sible opportunities to our neediest families, a well-implemented public-
service employment program would deliver high value for our dollars.
Notwithstanding the prospect that federal welfare-reform legislation will
reduce the number of people in our inner cities who are officially eligible
for support from the government, these bleak environments will continue
to produce large numbers who are ill-equipped to make it on their own.
And the fact that they may not be eligible for welfare payments does not
mean that they will cease to be costly to society. [p. 263]
This is what saddens me. Once again Frank feels compelled to argue
"completely apart from moral responsibility." Those of us who strive
to generate normative legal scholarship are being told, with ever in-
creasing if ever more puzzling force, that moral theory must be ban-
ished from our tool kit, replaced by something more avowedly conse-
quentialist and "pragmatic" - namely subjective welfare. 8 But is it
really the case that the fact vel non of our - of a decent society's, that
is - obligation to the less fortunate is a narrowly empirical matter?
That we must demonstrate that the gains to the poor somehow out-
weigh the "losses" to the rich - that the "net balance of social well
being" has increased - in the spirit of the third argument, above, in
order to advocate basic decency? Or, worse, must we show that there
is in fact no loss at all to the rich, in the spirit of the second argument?
That our "pragmatic self-interest" alone justifies all change? That our
money is being well spent on our own terms - we are getting a good
"bang for our buck," as the awful saying goes? Is this what we have
come to? And what will happen if the trend of our times continues,
and we cut more and more the official "support from the govern-
ment," so that the argument from backwards induction - we will have
to pay more for them later, so we might as well educate them now -
fails, as an accounting matter?
If this is where we have come, despair might be appropriate. Con-
sider Rawls's recent plaintive cry in response to the voices of a more
self-interested and amoral political theory: "If a reasonably just soci-
ety that subordinates power to its aims is not possible and people are
largely amoral, if not incurably cynical and self-centered, one might
ask with Kant whether it is worthwhile for human beings to live on the
earth?"49 Surely we can do better than to be better peacocks.
One ought to pause before prescribing in the name of a largely
amoral humanity. Frank does not. What passes for morality in
Luxury Fever gets wrapped up in Frank's discussion of "social norms"
48. See, e.g., POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 27; Kaplow & Shavell, Redistributing
Income, supra note 27.
49. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 17, at lxi.
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(pp. 201-03). This is an amorphous idea that has entered into the
normative lexicon of legal theory of late. 0 A large part of its role
seems to be to supplant anything approaching the autonomous
exercise of moral reasoning. Social norms just are, in the standard
view - though more often than not, the project of the "social norms"
school is to show how such norms represent a spontaneously
generated private ordering that tends towards efficiency, in the
specific sense of wealth-maximization. The normative theorist in any
event is relegated to a passive acceptance of such norms. Worse, in
their mere existence, the role of social norms is fully heteronomous -
individual actors are constrained to accept them, there is no reasoned
discourse, no wide or narrow or indeed any reflective equilibrium at
all.
It is in some sense astonishing - or ought to be - that Frank, an
economist and social scientist, seems "simply" to accept social norms
in his personal as in his professional life. Frank tells us that social
norms - and social norms alone - prevented him from buying that
bargain-priced Porsche in the 1980s: "[a]t that time, a red Porsche
convertible really would have been seen as an in-your-face car in a
community like ours" (p. 108). He still has doubts and regrets over
this fateful decision:
I still wonder whether I made the right decision. In the years since this
episode, a number of other Porsches have materialized here, and seeing
them always kindles a twinge of regret. But what is not in question is
that, at the time, there would have been a social price to pay had I
bought it. [pp. 168-69]
Fortunately enough (?), times and mores have changed a bit in Ithaca.
Frank now has a BMW (p. 203), and seems to think that if he could do
it all over again today, he would in fact buy the Porsche.
Perhaps worst of all, Frank doesn't even like the role of social
norms in combating luxury fever, in part because they are too frail, but
also because they are too "coercive" (p. 203). Heteronomy turns out
to be a drag - it makes it hard to buy even bargain-basement
Porsches. Better to put the tax system in place, so that we can all have
"luxury without apology." Free at last?
To be fair, I agree that we should have a fairly steep progressive
consumption tax, in part because we cannot place excessive moral de-
mands on our wealthy citizens. It is in some sense hard to be rich; too
much money can be a distraction and a constant source of temptation,
50. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLIcKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DIsPUTEs 123-26 (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social
Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998) (symposium issue on Social Norms, Social Meaning,
and the Economic Analysis of Law); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and
Negotiation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a
Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225
(1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
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and the opportunities for doing good with money are complex. A
progressive consumption tax sets up an institutionalized social struc-
ture in which individual wealthy capitalists are obliged to help, and are
given a choice of how to do so - continue to save and invest, helping
all through perpetuating the common capital stock, or spend on one's
own wants but cut a large check to the collective for the privilege of
doing so. The system sensitively takes into account human nature in
this way. But there is no reason we have to refrain, as Frank does,
from invoking the objective moral dimensions of such a tax - why we
must argue that this is a "win-win" deal even for "incurably cynical
and self-centered" people. After all, excessive spending on noncon-
spicuous private consumption can well be a moral harm - and it
would be just as affected by Frank's steeply progressive consumption
tax. Yet Frank cannot argue, by definition, that such spending is an
arms-race type problem that cannot make its individual producers
happy.
Fortunately, the facts of the matter do not point us down the
gloomy Darwinian path. As a strictly empirical matter - and this I
think is important, for lots of reasons - not all the rich have luxury
fever. In fact, most don't. This is the central point of the widely
popular The Millionaire Next Door, and it is backed up by more schol-
arly research 5l Wealthy savers are not imposing social harms in any
obvious way - saving is one of the activities that a reasonably just so-
ciety should want its most productive citizens to do, at least as long as
there are some constraints on the private use of capital to unjustly af-
fect politics or markets.5 2 Rawls writes of "frugal capitalists as op-
posed to the spendthrift aristocrats," the former being those who up-
hold their "natural duties to society."53  The problem with
contemporary tax policy is that it is backwards: it currently punishes
the thrifty millionaire-next-door types, and thus relatively rewards the
spendthrift with luxury fever.54 A progressive consumption tax re-
verses course; it falls on spenders, not savers. This seems like the fair
and just, as well as sensible, result, in large part because social struc-
tures do shape character and choice of lifestyle. One can come out
rather close to Frank on the details, in other words, without ignoring
the "moral dimension."
51. See STANLEY & DANKO, supra note 33, at 27-69; see also LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF,
WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS? (1989); McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 3, at 1187-88 and
notes (citing sources).
52. This point - that a consistent progressive consumption tax can regulate the use of
nominally private capital - I have consistently made in my work. See McCaffery, Being the
Best, supra note 35, at 632-33; McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 353-56.
53. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 299,537.
54. See McCaffery, Real Tax Reform, supra note 3, at 47.
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Frank's insights about the tendency, at least, towards excessive
conspicuous consumption are still critically important, but not because
we all, inevitably, have the fever. Rather we can understand life in
advanced wealthy capitalist societies as a constant battle between the
thrifty and the nonthrifty, those that have the fever and the million-
aires next door. There is even a risk that luxury fever is getting worse,
although Frank is largely anecdotal on this differential point. Pre-
cisely because lifestyles are variables that the social structure affects
- precisely, that is, because we are not "incurably" cynical and self-
interested - our tax policy ought to get it right. We make choices.
Frank even acknowledges - in passing - that we might be free: "I
do not mean to suggest that we are not creatures of free will on some
meaningful interpretation of the term" (p. 176). Social norms come
from somewhere. There can be better or worse norms, more or less
followed. The law can or cannot support these better ones: the law is
inevitably moral 5 This is especially so in an area as pervasive, large,
and coercive as tax.
As Machiavelli wrote, "hunger and poverty make men industrious,
[but] laws make them good. 5 6 If we drop the attempt to appeal to the
"better angels of our nature"' in the law, we can do no better than to
become happy peacocks. Let's hope we can aim higher, and in this at-
tempt to make us as good as we can be, moral theory - of the old
fashioned Kantian sort - deserves a seat at the table.
VI. A CHALLENGE FOR POLITICAL LIBERALISM
Before closing, I want to make a few comments on how a nonutili-
tarian, social contractarian approach to the problem of luxury fever -
and to tax policy - might play out.
Frank is clearly writing right in the grip of something that Rawls is
very much concerned with: the social bases of self-respect, among
other matters of moral psychology and social justice. But Frank's
mechanistic, materialistic analysis and conception of human nature sits
uneasily, if at all, with the very reason for Rawls's social contractarian
project - the working out of a Kantian conception of people as free
and equal moral beings. 8 Frank's picture of human beings also seems
too limited to be a global description of our species, although it cer-
tainly captures some aspects that at least some of us have at least some
55. This point I make in Edward J. McCaffery, Ronald Dworkin Inside Out, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 1043 (1997).
56. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DIsCoURSES 118 (Luigi Ricci,
Random House ed., 1950).
57. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, reprinted in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS,
1859-1865, at 224 (Library of America ed., 1989).
58. See Rawls, supra note 26.
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of the time. Frank's depiction of luxury fever and its root causes
should add to our understanding of our complex and frail human na-
tures. But it is simply not a matter of irresistible biological impulse
that people who have a lot of wealth must show it; this is a contextual
matter, and one that affects social justice.
Why then, has moral theory been banished from the social doctor's
medicine bag? Why can't Frank just come out and say that something
is indeed wrong with individuals' owning $2.7 million watches? Now
taking myself to be a moral theorist,59 maybe it is partly our fault. Af-
ter all, philosophy has been credited with killing god, embracing plu-
ralism, and letting the pragmatic genie out of the bottle. The once re-
gal discipline has of late flaunted its skepticism and tried to rebuild
itself on the basis of evolutionary biology or rational choice social the-
ory.' Why should a social scientist look to moral theory, when moral
theory itself has been running for help to the social sciences?
A related dimension of the same problem - the seeming inhospi-
tality of moral theory to normative social scientists like Frank - re-
lates to the role of religion. The critics of luxury fever in the past have
typically had God on their side. The ancient prophets fall into this
category, along with Luther and the Puritans, of course, and many
other religions condemn excessive luxury.6 Smith's condemnation of
luxuries came from within a distinct religion, Presbyterianism. Veblen
and Scitovsky, modem social scientists, stood outside any particular
religious tradition, but each evoked religious norms in understanding
the social regulation of consumption. Yet Frank, writing at the dawn
of a new millennium, with postmodemism and political correctness as-
cendant, does not - and within the social norms of our times, cannot
- invoke particular religious precepts. With the moral case against
59. I think my credentials are pretty good. I majored in philosophy as an undergradu-
ate, and have used philosophical perspectives in all of my work. See, e.g., McCaffery, Politi-
cal Liberal Case, supra note 3; McCaffery, Tax's Empire, supra note 34; McCaffery, Ronald
Dworkin Inside Out, supra note 55.
60. In this admittedly scandalously quick summary, I am thinking of the varied works of
Nietzsche (on the death of god), Richard Rorty (on pragmatism), Bernard Williams (on
skepticism and the limits of philosophy), Allan Gibbard (on the use of evolutionary biology),
David Gauthier, Brian Skyrms, Greg Kavka and others (on rational choice social theory).
See FRIEDRICH NmTZScHE, Thus SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA (R.J. Hollingdate trans., Penguin
ed. 1961) (1884); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979);
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985); ALLAN GIBBARD,
WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT (1990); DAVID
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (reprint ed. 1987); BRIAN SKYRMS, EVOLUTION OF
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1996); RATIONAL COMMITMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS
FOR GREGORY KAVKA (Jules Coleman et al. eds., 1998). See generally HILARY PUTNAM,
RENEWING PHILOSOPHY (1992).
61. See, e.g., STEPHEN INNES, CREATING THE COMMONWEALTH: THE ECONOMIC
CULTURE OF PURITAN NEW ENGLAND (1995); BARRY SHAIN, THE MYTH OF
INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1994);
MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 81-91 (1985) (discussing
views of Old Testament prophet Amos against luxury, inter alia).
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conspicuous consumption linked so firmly to specific religious doc-
trines and traditions, Frank is led to sweep the "moral dimension"
aside completely.
Rawls and his project of political liberalism both underscore the
problem and point the way out. On one hand, Rawls has embraced
the "fact of reasonable pluralism,"'62 and has thus banished particular
religious - as all comprehensive moral doctrines - from the exercise
of "public reason" to be used in setting up a just social structure. On
the other hand, Rawls has never retreated from the view that political
and moral theory compel us to attempt to establish, maintain, and
support just social institutions. The central challenge for our times is
to find a way to argue for morally acceptable social structures in a way
that avoids moralism, in its perjorative sense - in a way that avoids
privileging and entrenching any narrow, particular moral doctrine.
Tax is tied up in all of this. One of the important insights to be
gained from Luxury Fever is the way in which the tax system affects
matters of justice, as I have been arguing throughout my work - tax
can be both a cause of social justice problems and a cure. The harms
of luxury fever both affect the social distribution of material resources
and go to the social bases of self respect, now identified by Rawls as
perhaps chief among the primary goods.63 As Frank well illustrates,
the tax system is uniquely situated to address luxury fever. Thus, so-
cial contractarian theory - social justice generally - cannot ignore
the broad contours of the tax system on account of its impacts on the
basic structure of society and on the reasonable aspirations of its citi-
zens. All this leads to one final question: Can political liberalism,
stripped of anything approaching a religious voice, speak to luxury fe-
ver and its possible antidote via progressive taxation?
Of course it can. It is a critical mistake - to my mind, the worst
mistake one can make in reading Rawls's Political Liberalism - to
think that moral virtues have dropped out of the social contractarian
project. While remaining agnostic as to the internal contents of any
reasonable comprehensive religious or moral doctrine, Rawls
emphasizes time and again the importance of the political virtues,
chief among them the capacity to act out of a sense of justice.' A
basic moral psychology and moral sense has always been central to
Rawls's work. It is featured in an early piece on "The Sense of
Justice," played a large role in A Theory of Justice, and persists in
Political Liberalism. The very reason to care about justice as fairness,
after all, is that we believe that we can do better than to be happy
peacocks.
62. See RAWvLS, POLMCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 17, passim.
63. See id.
64. See JOHN RAwLs, The Sense of Justice, in COLLECrED PAPERS 96 (Samuel Freeman
ed., 1999).
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This gets back to the question of Frank's diagnosis. Perhaps luxury
fever is bad for its own patients, and perhaps it is an arms race, the
solution to which will be a win-win for all, no matter how incurably
cynical and self-centered we might be. But these ought not to be the
primary reasons for curbing the fever. Social justice should be. The
excessive spending of the rich affects the allocation of resources,
making nonluxury goods more "dear," in Luther's epigraph; repre-
sents a failure to save from the capitalist classes best able to do so;
lacks objective urgency, in T.M. Scanlon's (or Veblen's) sense;6 5 and
incites the kind of envy that Teddy Roosevelt noticed in another
opening epigraph. Social scientists tend to rule out envy, for counting
envy as a harm would disqualify many social changes from satisfying
the Pareto principle. Roosevelt's quotation suggests that maybe "we
of moderate means" are to be blamed, for we do the harm of envy and
hatred to ourselves. But why should we simply rule a natural human
feeling out of bounds in normative social theory? And why is it the
case that envy is always and everywhere a self-inflicted wound? In A
Theory of Justice, Rawls writes sensitively and well about envy, distin-
guishing between "excusable" envy and spite, linking envy to the so-
cial bases of self respect, and considering the conditions for a "hostile
breakout of envy," importantly including within them the loss of a
sense of natural duties among the rich.6 If the wealthy are signaling
their power and obtaining additional benefits by owning million-dollar
watches and 45,000 square foot mansions, is it really improper for the
rest of us to complain?
If Frank's arguments add to the case against excessive luxury
spending, I am inclined to think more power to them. But note the
ways in which Frank and Rawls are directly opposite, and not just in
their concern with subjective versus objective values, third parties or
not. Frank's picture is one of an essentially unfree, biologically driven
human nature that must sometimes bind itself to the mast. It is be-
cause we are slaves to our appetites and drives that we must give up
certain freedoms in the name of greater hedonistic pleasure. To
Rawls and Kant before him, we are first and foremost free and equal
moral beings. It is to protect and enhance our freedom and equality
that we must curtail those actions of some of us that limit the freedoms
and basic equalities of others of us. Holding fast to that vision of free-
dom, autonomy, and morality may be more important in the end than
curing luxury fever. After all, ideas matter.
65. See VEBLEN, supra note 9; T.M. Scanlon, Preferences and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655
(1975).
66. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 530-41.
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VII. THE END?
Robert Frank has written another good and important book. It
identifies a major problem facing contemporary America, and it ad-
vances a smart, sensible solution to that problem. In bringing to a
wide general public a powerful set of arguments for a progressive con-
sumption tax, Frank has done the world he lives in a good turn. I just
wish that Frank and others arguing this way could more comfortably
step outside the limited quasi-science of self-interested, subjective wel-
farist theories to make objective moral claims, and that contemporary
moral and political philosophy would be more inviting to people of
such interests.
We are still born free, but we are still everywhere in chains.
Money is everywhere, and even our normative scholars have been se-
duced by its luster. By giving us a "simple and painless" way to enjoy
"luxury without apology," I cannot believe that Frank has pointed the
way towards our ultimate human liberation. Maybe one day we can
step outside the grip of money and money's worth as a metric of our
deeper moral worth, and become free at last. For in the end, the path
of enlightenment may best lead to a future, not where no one buys or
wears a Patek Phillipe watch, but where none of the rest of us notice
those that do.
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